

**“Making the Spoon”**  
**Analyzing and Employing Stability Power in**  
**Counterinsurgency Operations**

**A Monograph**

**By**

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## Abstract

MAKING THE SPOON: ANALYZING AND EMPLOYING STABILITY POWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS by Major Sean P Davis, US Army, 65 pages.

In the wake of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, T.E. Lawrence's description of counterinsurgency (COIN) analogous to "eating soup with a knife," has new meaning in our contemporary military. It describes our kinetic conventional army (the knife) painstakingly operating in a nebulous environment (the soup), attempting to kill or capture terrorists. This monograph adapts the US military's sustainment and support capabilities to provide the military a counterinsurgency "spoon," through the theory of stability power.

This thesis determines if the US Military's conduct of COIN operations requires the assignment of combat sustainment and support units as the main effort. In assigning these units this new decisive role, the military maximizes their intrinsic organizational advantages in non-kinetic stability operations. Such stability operations encompass what is decisive in defeating an insurgency. However, the design of current combat power analysis tools is not applicable for stability operations. The determination of a unit's capability in stability operations requires a new analysis model.

Therefore, the military needs *Relative Stability Power Analysis*. Defining an organization's *relative stability power* is its ability to simultaneously represent all the elements of national power in proportion to the scale of the intervention, to stabilize a failing state. Assessing a unit's ability to do this is a hybrid model of systems theory, the military's logistical estimate model, and the relative combat power analysis tool. Military affairs experts require such a model to justify how many troops are required in the "clear" and "hold" phases and the requirements of the "build phase" in COIN operations. Placing these "build" requirements against the capabilities of the coalition determines operational shortfalls. Requirements-capabilities-shortfalls in Security, Water, Electricity, Academics, Transportation, Medical, and Sanitation (SWEAT-MS) describe Relative Stability Power Analysis.

As the theory of stability power requires a new analytical model, it also requires a new concept of employment. A concept of employing stability power is a hybrid of subject matter on counterinsurgency, crisis response, and domestic policing. Testing this concept in a realistic scenario assists in evaluating its advantages and disadvantages. The scenario is a sustainment brigade (SUS BDE) operating as a Stability Reconstruction Sustainment Brigade (SRSB) securing the northern Iraqi city of Mosul in 2004. A commander that actually operated in this region during this time (COL H.R. McMaster, 3d Armor Cavalry Regiment) determines if it is feasible, acceptable, and suitable to employ sustainment units in this new capacity.

This work concludes by submitting recommendations on how to employ stability power immediately, in the next few years and long term. Short-run recommendations include implementing attributes of stability power under Brigade Combat Team (BCT) control. Such attributes as assigning forward support companies to Iraqi security forces, and building combat outpost or micro operating bases securing the deliverance of essential public goods. In the mid-term, relieving BCTs with SRSBs allows for the full economy of force advantages in employing stability power. The major significance of instituting SRSBs is expanding the pool of available units from only BCTs to all brigades capable of fighting COIN. This facilitates the army's ability to maximize the inherent advantages of all its forces. In the long-term, much as the US Army Air Corps became the US Air Force, this Stability and Reconstruction Forces (SRF) splits from the Army into a separate service. A SRF corps advances the US national capacity to conduct stability and reconstruction operations. In all, this vision of a force with balanced combat and stability power may prove the only acceptable alternative to meet the immediate emergency and security requirements of a failing state.

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## INTRODUCTION

What the United States needs now is a specially trained and equipped contingency force capable of preventing insurgency, genocide, state failure and full scale war. Envision the utility of such a force today in Iraq or Afghanistan. It could be a force capable of building roads and communication networks to unite disenfranchised regions with personnel skilled in public health and the mass distribution of food, water, electricity, fuel, and dry goods. This stability and reconstruction force could simultaneously alleviate a humanitarian crisis while securing a civilian population against an opposing insurgency. This is a vision of a force that already exists today. It is the US military's logistical sustainment and combat support units. Unfortunately, the military does not employ these types of units in direct action roles. The purpose here is to present a more efficient way of planning and conducting stability and counterinsurgency operations by maximizing all assets available.<sup>1</sup> To assist in accomplishing this purpose is a new theory of stability power analysis and employment. It is a theory that identifies what organizations are more or less inherently capable to meet the requirements of stability and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The end state is to prove that the US Military must consider combat sustainment and support units as the main effort when executing stability, counterinsurgency, and nation-building operations.

Historically, logistical units exist only to support the maneuver commanders. The idea of these support commands becoming a supported effort is a paradigm shift.<sup>2</sup> What has changed, that requires and permits sustainment and support units to expand beyond their support roles? There are those that theorize the nature of war is changing. Many of these theorists describe this change as waging war versus waging peace.<sup>3</sup> Since the fall of the Soviet Union our military is

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<sup>1</sup>David H. Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq," *Military Review* 86, no. 1; (01//Jan/Feb2006): 12. Lesson number 7 States everyone does nation-building

<sup>2</sup>Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2d, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 210. Paradigm as defined by Thomas Kuhn as a requirement for revolution in scientific knowledge

<sup>3</sup>Thomas Barnett, "Brief on Pentagon's New Map and Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating," (*Fort Leavenworth, Kan.*: the College, 2005). In this interview on CSPAN this author highlights this difference between the old theories that nations previously went to war solely to impose there will on



conducting peace waging operations with increasing frequency.<sup>4</sup>

Waging the peace, known also as nation building, stability operations, and counterinsurgency, involves employing non-kinetic, non-lethal elements of national power. The military's new counterinsurgency manual summarizes these requirements by stating, "the best weapons for these operations do not shoot."<sup>5</sup> In Iraq and Afghanistan, our military is waging the peace ill equipped and unprepared for such non-kinetic, non-lethal civil requirements.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, our military affairs experts are unfamiliar with the requirements of nation-building and stability operations.<sup>7</sup> This results in their inability to properly advise our civilian leadership on such actions.<sup>8</sup> Evidence of this unfamiliarity with stability operations is the debate that immediately followed the change of strategy in Iraq.

On January 10, 2007, President Bush addressed the nation on changing the US strategy in Iraq. Many have summarized the President's six-point strategy as "*Clear-Hold-Build*."<sup>9</sup> Following this presidential address, a debate ensued scrutinizing the authorization for additional 20,000 troops and the strategy itself. This scrutinizing exhibits the urgency of need for military affairs experts to provide our policy makers a more detailed analysis for troop requirements in counterinsurgency operations. The military's new Counterinsurgency Manual suggests a *clear-hold-build* strategy as being troop intensive and requires at least a 20 to 1000 ratio (or 1 to 50).<sup>10</sup>

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another nation. By contrast, we go to war to achieve an enduring peace. Some historians argue that waging of peace evolved from the lessons of post World War I. The occupational forces in Japan and Germany post World War II certainly exhibit proof of this historical argument. As with many military theorists this work does not argue that the waging of peace is some new phenomena per se. What is new is the contemporary context of non-state actors and "super-powered individuals" that can threaten even a hegemonic military power.

<sup>4</sup>Somali, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Liberia, Afghanistan, Iraq, too name a few.

<sup>5</sup> US Army. *Field Manual no. 3-24*, 1-27.

<sup>6</sup>Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II : The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, 1std ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 432

<sup>7</sup>Ibid

<sup>8</sup>Martin L. Cook, *The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military*, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004+), 82-86.

<sup>9</sup> Senate Foreign Relations, *Opening Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC*, Senate sess., October 19, 2005 2005, 1. Secretary Rice stated more specifically, the deployment of an additional 20,000 troops to clear the insurgents influence over the population, hold the ground and key infrastructure to allow the provincial reconstruction teams to "build."

<sup>10</sup>US Army. *Field Manual no. 3-24*, 1-67.

With 6 million people in Baghdad the security requirement applying this ratio are 120,000 troops. Combined with additional Iraqi forces the total number of coalition security forces (with the additional 20,000) equates to approximately 145,000.<sup>11</sup> However, satisfying the 1:50 ratio in this case only addresses the “clear” and “hold” aspects; and it fails to address the capabilities needed in the “build” phase known also as stability and reconstruction operations.<sup>12</sup>

These problems summarize a cognitive void in our military strategy in prosecuting stability operations. This void exhibits the lack of institutional knowledge in how we analyze and conduct stability operations. The significance of not understanding stability operations is that we do not understand what many military theorists consider decisive in winning the COIN fight.<sup>13</sup> Additionally, this void enables several think tanks to interject the idea of creating a new peace-waging army to assume this mission.<sup>14</sup>

The embodiment of the new peace-waging army idea is House Resolution (HR) 1084 *Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2007*.<sup>15</sup> This congressional act authorizes the establishment of the 250 active member *civilian-response-corps*. An organization whose purpose is to relieve the “burden” of stability operations put upon our armed forces.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> "President's Address to the Nation: New Way Forward in Iraq," in White House [database online]. Washington D.C. January 10, 2007 [cited January 10, 2007]. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html>. Total Number of Troops is derived from 10 January 2007 address. The 20,000 troop surge (or six Brigade Combat Teams) brings the total number of US soldiers assigned to the Multi-National Division Baghdad to approximately 45,000. ISF will contribute approximately 100,000 (promised by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki).

<sup>12</sup> Additionally, the 120,000 troops in Baghdad do not address the whole of Iraq. Examining the total OIF Troop to Civilian ratio it appears as though the troop strength meets this doctrinal minimum. In November 2006, the Troop to Civilian Ratio is 1:56 based on 322,000 Iraqi Security Forces, and the 150,000 coalition troops versus the 26 million Iraqis. However, the 26 Million Iraqis includes the 5.3 million Kurds. The peaceful Kurdish region in northern Iraq requires no counterinsurgents. Therefore the ratio is actually, 1 soldier per 44 Iraqis when we subtract out the 5.3 Million Kurds. This ratio is easily digestible for people wanting a rough understanding of complex battlefield calculus. The major deficiency of this ratio is that it treats all populations the same. A model incorporating ethnic and culture is required.

<sup>13</sup> Theorists such as David Galula, Sir Robert Thompson, and Anthony Joes view the primacy of stability operations in winning COIN.

<sup>14</sup> Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, 353.

<sup>15</sup> "House Resolution 1084: Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2007 (Introduced in House)," in The Library of Congress (THOMAS) [database online]. Washington D.C. February 15, 2007 [cited February 15, 2007]. Available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/>. Sec 7 authorization of the civilian response readiness corps

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, Section 2



However, did the authors of HR 1084 considering all the 5W's (Who, What, When, Where, and Why) in the mission statement of this resolution?<sup>17</sup> Particularly, the "where" as HR 1084 describes is "a country that is at risk of, in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife." Is this description of a country in the process of failing adequate?<sup>18</sup> Is it realistic that such an organization can promise to relieve the burden of nation building upon our military in such hostile environments as a failing state? Furthermore, does the US government need to build a new peace-waging army or does the military need to adapt to a type of warfare that has been required of armies throughout history? Finally, can this adaptation actually enhance our military's capabilities in its traditional warfighting role?

To answer these questions we must understand what is required in waging the peace. Such requirements encapsulate what this author calls *stability power*. By understanding *stability power* we can determine what organizations are more or less capable of conducting nation-building operations. This understanding facilitates the argument that a more efficient use of our logistical and support units can provide a military solution.<sup>19</sup> These logistical and support units represent the soft power<sup>20</sup> within the US military. They have expertise in the other elements of national power while still possessing the military element. Assigning these peace-waging tasks to sustainment and support units the US Military can enhance its future capacity to support war, while preserving the combat arms units' ability to wage war.

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<sup>17</sup>This congressional act identifies stability and reconstruction operations and the State Department as what and who. Because today, the Military is burdened with predominately civil functions of nation-building, is the when and why.

<sup>18</sup>HR 1084 states in its findings that the resources of the Armed Forces have been burdened by having to undertake stabilization and reconstruction tasks in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries of the world that could have been performed by civilians, which has resulted in lengthy deployments for members of the Armed Forces.

<sup>19</sup>When reading the phrase a "military solution" most people immediately visualize Airborne Rangers jumping out of an aircraft at 500ft, or perhaps the thermal video image of a precision bomb approaching the a structure housing a high value target. By contrast, this author is referring to the army that exists behind these kinetic images. This is an army of doctors and health workers, of supply specialist and lawyers. This is an army that can distribute millions of tons of goods over vast distances into hostile areas. This is a less glamorous image than the one displayed in video games and in the movies. This is an image of those soldiers who serve those who serve.

<sup>20</sup>Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 191. As discussed later the author of Soft Power Joseph Nye, the former assistant secretary of defense does not view the military possessing such soft power.

## Introducing Stability Power

Any government agency can exhibit all the elements of national power. Those that say the Department of State does not have the element of military power have never seen the automatic rifle toting member of a USAID team in Iraq or Afghanistan.<sup>21</sup> Likewise, those that say the armed forces only represent the coercive military element of national power have never seen the diplomacy required of a Regional Combatant Commander.<sup>22</sup> The point here is an organization that can simultaneously represent all the elements of national power in proportion to the scale of the intervention makes it more powerful in stabilizing a failing state. In war, what defines a unit as more or less powerful is the amount combat power it possesses. Therefore, it is logical to define *stability power* as what is more or less powerful in waging peace. In war, an organization's destructive capabilities amounts to level of its combat power. Conversely, an organization's stability power is in its capacity to project and self-secure all the elements of national power in proportion to the operational environment to prevent or mitigate state failure. These are multi-functional requirements of peace waging operations that demand multifunctional organizations.

This is the simultaneous requirement of Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics (DIME) synchronized in a unity of effort.<sup>23</sup> In the past the easily identifiable lines of transition between war and peace, liberation and occupation, and soft versus hard power facilitated synchronization of these elements. Previously, a signature of a treaty or the waving of a white flag defined transitioning lines between lead agencies.<sup>24</sup> Today, there is a blurring of these transitional lines as external non-state actors and internal spoilers exploit the vulnerabilities of a state in post conflict/crisis. Stability operations that can quickly fortify a failing state's legitimate monopoly of national power can deter such spoilers and prove decisive in winning the Global

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<sup>21</sup>This author personally supplied USAID agents with 9mm rounds to arm their MP-5 that each of them toted throughout the Baghdad

<sup>22</sup>Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 1st ed. (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 590.

<sup>23</sup>US Army. *Field Manual no. 3-24*, 2-1

<sup>24</sup> Bush, "President's Address to the Nation: New Way Forward in Iraq,"

War on Terrorism.<sup>25</sup> That is stability power.

## Overview

The theory of stability power: analysis and employment, provides evidence that the US Military's conduct of these operations require the consideration of combat support units as the decisive effort. To justify this argument the following five steps must be satisfied. The first step is to review the significant changes in our operating environment that only recently allow combat support and sustainment units to operate in this direct action role. These changes are the foundation of this theory and what makes the requirement of a stability power enduring. Step two defines the relationship between COIN, stability operations and nation-building and establishes these operations as our contemporary norm. The third step is to prove that stability operations, not killing insurgents, are decisive in defeating an insurgency, and that nation building is the best method in preventing state failure.

The fourth step is to define the theory of stability power. This step will simultaneously describe how to analyze and employ stability power. The final step is testing and evaluating stability power. This step evaluates relative stability power analysis and employing stability power using a realistic counterfactual scenario. The military calls this war gaming.<sup>26</sup> The purpose of this war-game is to demonstrate the concept of employing support units in accordance with new COIN doctrine. Additionally, this war-game will allow the reader to critically evaluate this theory's advantages and disadvantages in a contemporary setting using specific evaluation criteria. This final step will determine if the war-game results are feasible, acceptable, and suitable through an interview with the one of the principal commanders that actually controlled

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<sup>25</sup>Max Weber, *Politics as a Vocation*, Fortress Press, 1965), 57.

<sup>26</sup> United States. Dept. of the Army, FM 1.02 the U.S. Army Operational Terms and Symbols; Field Manual no. 1.02, (Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027: Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, 2001), 323-N/A. , FM 1.02 defines "war-gaming – A step-by-step process of action, reaction, and counteraction for visualizing the execution of each friendly course of action (COA) in relation to enemy COAs and reactions. It explores the possible branches and sequels to the primary plan resulting in a final plan and decision points for critical actions. See also commander's visualization. (FM 101-5)"

the area of operations of this counterfactual scenario.<sup>27</sup>

Through these five steps, this work will propose a solution on how the military can meet the demands of our current GWOT and counterinsurgency operations. Such demands as described by T.E. Lawrence as similar to “eating soup with a knife.”<sup>28</sup> It describes our kinetic conventional army (the knife) painstakingly operating in a nebulous environment (the soup), attempting to kill or capture terrorists.<sup>29</sup> Developing the concept of stability power presents a different perspective of the military other than the kinetic knife. Stability power analysis uncovers the multi-functional capabilities the US Military possesses and indeed a “spoon” for Lawrence’s analogy.

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<sup>27</sup> McMaster, H., R. Colonel U.S. Army, "Interview with COL McMaster; Commander Assigned Operations in the Nineveh Province," Interview (2006): 1-0. The interview is with COL H.R. McMaster (CDR, 3ACR (OIF3)).

<sup>28</sup>T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex ; New York: Penguin Books, 1962), 700.

<sup>29</sup>John A. Nagl and Schoomaker, Peter J. (FRW), *Learning to Eat Soup with A Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, Univ of Chicago Pr. As also described by LTC Nagl in his work entitled with the analogy.

## CHAPTER ONE: “Condition Setting” Understanding the Contemporary Operational Environment

Why is there a renewed interest in Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) in the US Army and in the US Government? More importantly, are stability and reconstruction operations decisive in winning COIN operations? To effectively answer these questions requires an understanding of how our Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) changed after the destruction of the Twin Towers. These changes have occurred chronologically since September 11, 2001 and compel the US Military to assume COIN as a core competency. Furthermore, by proving that the Global War in Terrorism (GWOT) is actually a global counterinsurgency it facilitates stability power, not combat power, decisive in winning the GWOT. Three significant changes in the COE make possible the theory of stability power and sustainment units as the main effort in stability operations. By proving these changes are not ephemeral is to demonstrate the relevance and enduring value in developing stability power.

### COE Change 1: “Failed States Matter”<sup>30</sup>

Why is nation-building vital to US National interest? Continually answering this question is essential in maintaining the public’s awareness of the risks (and costs) involved in not nation-building.<sup>31</sup> More than any other reason, public support diminishes due to the lack of understanding the stakes involved.<sup>32</sup> The first step in clearly communicating the stakes involved is by changing nation building to the more appropriate term state building.<sup>33</sup> The US, as a tolerant pluralistic society is not attempting to build or change a culture and common language of a people otherwise known as nation. By contrast, the US promotes the legitimacy of a state and

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<sup>30</sup>CSIS and Orr, 353.

<sup>31</sup>Appendix A provides an opportunity cost analysis of not conducting nation-building in Afghanistan

<sup>32</sup>Eric V. Larson and Bogdan Savych, *American Support for U.S. Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2005), 213. Public support for such global interventions historically wanes over time and with increased casualties. However, this RAND publication cites the critical reasons for waning public support for nation building is failure to communicate the stakes involved.

<sup>33</sup>Alexander T. Lennon, *The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 292. The confusion between nation and state is a topic of this reference.

or an allied government's just monopoly over of all elements of national power.<sup>34</sup> By changing this terminology, we more clearly define our true purpose when pursuing such interventions. However, what are our enemy's intentions in these nation-states?

Entwined with whether we intervene in failed states are the problems in how we confront the enemy, al Qaeda. Unable to oppose the United States on the conventional battlefield, our new adversaries choose insurgency and terrorism as their means of warfare.<sup>35</sup> This selection of insurgency to asymmetrically oppose a military hegemon is not new and doesn't necessarily demand US intervention. What is new, and demands attention is global insurgent warfare augmented with micro-technology, mass transportation, and attributes of globalization.<sup>36</sup> These technologies facilitate the non-state actor's capability to threaten even a powerful military hegemonic state.<sup>37</sup>

Many international affairs experts echo this technology and rapid innovation on an exponential scale as a catalyst for increasing global intervention. Francis Fukuyama,<sup>38</sup> Thomas

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<sup>34</sup>Weber, 57.

<sup>35</sup>Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone : On War in the 21st Century*, (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 2. This reference describes an Al Qaeda as an evolved insurgency

<sup>36</sup>Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree [1999]*, 1std ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999), 9. Friedman coined the word globalization as the term describing our contemporary operating environment. Friedman defines globalization as: "it is the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before ..." "This process of globalization is also producing a powerful backlash from those brutalized or left behind by this new system."

<sup>37</sup>Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam : Holy War and Unholy Terror*, Modern Library ed. (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 184. Furthermore, insurgents will partner with the local ruling despots again to exploit the rage of their oppressed citizens for their own evil recruitment. This civil rage ferments in poverty and oppression and is displaced from those responsible (the ruling despotic regime), to the perceived uncaring and materialistic western society and its allies. This author in Iraq personally witnessed this. Many children schools in Baghdad had drawings celebrating planes crashing into the World Trade Towers in New York. Writings of Sayid Qutb calls for an unrelenting vanguard Jihad to project jihad to the west. Al Qaeda exploits Islam to display the US as a global empire that oppresses the Islamic people through apostate regimes.

Osama bin Laden, "Bin Laden Tape: Text," British Broadcasting Corporation (2003): Osama bin Laden stated: "We also stress to honest Muslims that they should move, incite, and mobilize the (Islamic) nation, amid such grave events and hot atmosphere so as to liberate themselves from those unjust and reneged ruling regimes, which are enslaved by the United States. They should also do so to establish the rule of God on earth. The most qualified regions for liberation are Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the land of the two holy mosques (Saudi Arabia), and Yemen..."

<sup>38</sup>Francis Fukuyama, *Nation-Building : Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 262. As the editor of *Nation-Building: beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, Fukuyama incorporates ideas from several international relations experts and think tanks on the need for state building. In this work Fukuyama states: "*The frequency and intensity of U.S. international nation-building*



Freidman,<sup>39</sup> Thomas Barnett, and Joseph Nye are just some of the international affairs experts who call for expanding the US role in state promotion and building.<sup>40</sup> These experts address many reasons and differing techniques for state building. A plethora of reasons for and against state building sometimes confuse our citizens into not accept why failed states matters.<sup>41</sup>

For those in military service such confusion does not exist. The signing of the Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.5<sup>42</sup> and the National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD44) has removed all confusion.<sup>43</sup> These directives order the US Military and Government agencies to develop capacity for state-building and stability operations. Some in the military may consider applying the old bureaucratic procedure of waiting out a current administration hoping for a more favorable policy change. However, over the last fifteen years both Democrat and Republican politicians in office have called for troops in state-building assignments all over the

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*efforts have increased since the end of the Cold War...and after September 11, 2001, it became clear that weak or failed states could sponsor terrorism that threatened the core security interests of the world's sole superpower, the United States."*

<sup>39</sup>Friedman, "The Lexus and the Olive Tree [1999]," 394.

<sup>40</sup>"CNN RELIABLE SOURCES: *Interview with Thomas Friedman*," in CNN [database online]. Alanta, Ga August 31, 2003 [cited 2003]. Available from <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0308/31/rs.00.html>. Recently, in the context of Iraq, Freidman advocates more of a state-building approach by treating Iraq more like Post WWII Germany and less like 1980 Grenada In an interview with CNN Freidman stated: "*Bush team talks as if it gets it, but it doesn't act like it. The Bush team tells us rightly that this nation-building project is the equivalent of Germany in 1945, and yet so far it has approached the postwar in Iraq as if it's Grenada in 1982.*"

<sup>41</sup>Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State : The American Encounter with the World since 1776*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 286. Walter McDougall explores this confusion of our national foreign policy in his book, "Promised Land, Crusader State, and the American Encounter with the World since 1776." This Pre-9/11 work displays the relevance of our culture, the context of our nation's birth, and the various foreign policy traditions that form our contemporary policies. McDougall discusses the foundation of our principles in what he calls the "*Old Testament*." Although the Old Testament principles initially led to isolationist policies, it planted the seeds for the "New Testament" policies. These New Testament policies vary between the Marshal Plan and Wilsonian ideals of spreading democracy. McDougall states our influence of Old Testament principles (like unalienable rights for man) drive us to foreign interventions when confronted with the horrors of a despotic regime.

<sup>42</sup>Perhaps the most telling display of the change from MCO to the acceptance of stability operations and the requirements of COIN began in 2004. DoD Directive number 3000.5 acknowledges the need for improving nation-building capacity. Secretary Rumsfeld directed the Army to develop its response capability and doctrine for stability operations. This is a measure later enforced by the under sectary of the Army Dr. Nadaner in his August 2006 survey assessing the Army's acceptance of this directive.

<sup>43</sup>U.S., National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-44: Management of Interagency Efforts in Reconstruction and Stabilization, N/A, 44, sec. NSPD, 1 (2005). "The purpose of this Directive is to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation, for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife."

world.<sup>44</sup>

These requirements are truly bi-partisan and appear not to be going away on their own. Therefore, the military cannot “wait out for more favorable policy” and avoid state-building operations. The US Military must develop our capacity to “wage war and to wage the peace.”<sup>45</sup> This first change summarizes the contemporary need for a state-building force. The next change begins to describe the security requirements of such a state-building force to operate in the non-permissive operational environment, that is typical of a failing(ed) state.

## **COE Change 2: The Warrior Ethos**

The US Military’s sustainment and support organizations are masters of the non-kinetic skills of logistics, engineering, and health support. On the other hand, prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), it was perceived that these units could not conduct the kinetic skills of defending themselves effectively. The ambush of the 507<sup>th</sup> Maintenance Company in An Nasiriyah, Iraq and subsequent capture of Private Lynch and other soldiers of this company personify this Army wide problem.<sup>46</sup> Since this incident sustainment and support organizations have changed their culture, training, and equipment to meet these security demands.<sup>47</sup> Today, in Iraq we can observe proof of this change on the major supply routes, and in the force protection of our operating bases. This change is an essential requirement of any stability and reconstruction force: self-security.

What enabled this transformation are the concepts of the “Penetathlete” and “warrior ethos.”<sup>48</sup> These concepts led to improvements in combat action training for support soldiers. The

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<sup>44</sup>President G.H.W. Bush with Desert Storm, and Somalia; President Clinton with NSPD 56 and Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, East Timor

<sup>45</sup>Barnett, Thomas P.M. 2004, 31-34

<sup>46</sup>Gregory Fontenot et al., *On Point : The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 1st Naval Institute Press ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 411-413

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, 411. This discusses on how the need for logistical security in noncontiguous environment is not new and in fact was the reason for the existence of the US Army’s first forward operating base (FOB) at Fort Leavenworth, KS, the starting point of the Santa Fe and Oregon Trails.

<sup>48</sup>United States. Dept. of the Army, "A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army," (2006)

Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) is an example of such training.<sup>49</sup> BLOC is the indoctrination of all new junior officers into the requirements of combat patrolling, and integration of combined arms operations. Training that enables these support officers not to just pull security but to integrate all the battlefield functions to defend their sustainment and support units. Changes in culture and training are in the realm of the mental domain, what about the physical?

There was a monopolistic practice in the allocation of resources within the US Army. Such resources as ammunition, training land and innovations in combat equipment went primarily to the oligopoly of the Infantry, Armor, and Artillery Corps. Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, armed with Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) has broken up this oligopoly and balanced resource allocation based on need and not type of unit.<sup>50</sup> Before 9/11, the army prioritized equipment and resources by type and category of unit.<sup>51</sup> Based on the false assumption about the level of combat support soldiers would face, the number of weapon systems authorized and ammunition allocated was minimal.<sup>52</sup> In Iraq (and previously in Vietnam) the battlespace is non-linear and non-contiguous.<sup>53</sup> The frontline of these wars begin and end at the

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<sup>49</sup>"1st Battalion 11th Infantry Regiment Basic Officer Leader Course II (BOLC II)," in US Army Infantry School [database online]. Fort Benning, Ga January 24, 2007 [cited 2007]. Available from <https://www.infantry.army.mil/bolc/>.

<sup>50</sup>United States. Dept. of the Army, "A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army," Game Plan Place holder. The ARFORGEN Model: is one year training, one year ready for combat, and one year in combat and as per LTG Richard Cody's brief to congress dated 14 September 2006 we are unable to achieve this goal.

<sup>51</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-38: Training; Standards in Weapons Training*, Department of the Army ed. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1997), 180-N/A. STRAC AUCL Sustainment units were category "two" and "three" units armed and equipped as an economy of force in a resource constrained world

<sup>52</sup>The 1995 Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for a Forward Support Battalion was not authorized M240 Machine Guns, the weapon system proven essential urban environment engagements. For example, the rationale for not "armoring" our logistical vehicle fleet was that our rear area would always be secure. Equally, the allocation of munitions is a good example the balance of resources. As a category II unit in the 1990s a M2 .50Cal Machine Gunner in logistical battalion was allocated 500 rounds per year. The annual requirement to qualify on this weapon system is a minimum of 1500 rounds. Since then the Standard and Allocations for ammunition is based not on the unit's category but its number of weapons systems.

<sup>53</sup>Richard E. Killblane, "Circle the Wagons: The History of US Army Convoy Security," (2005): 9

gates of forward operating bases (FOB).<sup>54</sup> A not arming and equipping sustainment unit based on a linear column fight contradicts this reality. Today, these units possess the cutting edge armor kits and have received equipment and weapon systems that have policed up these false assumptions.<sup>55</sup>

Changing the expectations of support soldiers, and equipping them to this end, the army facilitates expanding their role. A role that requires the simultaneous employment of essential services in direct support of a civil authority while sustaining US service members in combat. Additionally, these changes highlight an important requirement of stability power. Organizations pursuing stability and reconstruction operations in a failing state must possess more than just civil non-kinetic constructive functions. Such a unit must also possess security at the local-individual level. Local individual security includes having a line of communication to the highest level of military national power to negate the possibility of overmatch from an unforeseen threat. Some units have already expanded the use of their support units to conduct operations traditionally assigned to maneuver combat arms units.<sup>56</sup> However, employing sustainment and support units in this way would have been non-doctrinal.

### **COE Change 3: New Enabling Doctrine**

The third change is one of doctrine. The major obstacle of this concept and what highlights its significance is the lack of a close historical reference. Specifically, there are no examples of a brigade and above support unit operating autonomously and holistically across all the lines of operation required in a COIN fight.<sup>57</sup> On December 15, 2006 the publication of the US Army

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<sup>54</sup>Ibid., 37.

<sup>55</sup>Another improvement in equipping and arming our support soldiers is the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) program. The RFI provides key weapon systems, up-armor of vehicles, and body armor to support soldiers that were previously only available to combat arms soldiers. The balancing of assets based on need and not unit type is one of the principles enacted in the new ARFORGEN. As ARFORGEN comes under fire for not meeting its base purpose of stabilizing the Army in time of war we should temper the discourse with these successes.

<sup>56</sup>In 2003, 626 Forward Support Battalion (FSB) was assigned security of the Talafar Airfield. In 2005 the 215<sup>th</sup> FSB was given an area of operations outside of Baghdad to secure.

<sup>57</sup>Specifically Sustainment Brigades (SUS BDE) and Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (MEBs).

and Marine Corps's counterinsurgency manual reduced this obstacle and began to fade the line between supporting and supported units. Today, the US Army has not fully digested the implications of *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations* and specifically *Chapter 8 Sustainment*.

In Chapter 8, the lead table (8-1) states that in the operational environment of counterinsurgency “*Logistic units and assets can be assigned as decisive and shaping operations.*” This statement changes the traditional operational role of logistical units from subservient supporter to the decisive effort in stability operations. Since its publications there has been no discourse within the logistical community on how we can assume this new role. An example of this lack of discourse is in the current logistic doctrine outside of FM 3-24. The US Army's new *Modular Force Logistics Concept, Version 6*, a publication meant to capture emerging logistical doctrine does not incorporate this new decisive role. By contrast it describes only implications of possibly having to stock humanitarian supplies.<sup>58</sup> The logistical community must expand upon the Army's new doctrine in FM 3-24 and inspire discourse on how logisticians can become decisive.

In addition to the expanding responsibilities of sustainment units, Chapter 8 provides descriptive guidance in how to analyze stability operations. Table 8-2 depicts this analysis of the civil essential services that have been “burdening” our combat arms units, against the capabilities the military's sustainment units and personnel.<sup>59</sup> Complimenting this table is the subsequent discussion on “the continuum of essential services.”<sup>60</sup> This continuum provides a conceptual guide in the deliverance of public goods while avoiding the counterproductive side effect of a civilian population falsely reliant on US service members. This new doctrine suggests that sustainment units are decisive in COIN operations. More importantly, it is one of three changes that facilitate the military satisfying the stability power demands of the GWOT without degrading

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<sup>58</sup>United States Army and Headquarters, Combined Arms Support Command, *Modular Force Logistics Concept: Version 6*, (Fort Lee, Virginia: Doctrine Directorate, CASCOT, 2006, September), 228-N/A.

<sup>59</sup>US Army. *Field Manual no. 3-24*, 8-12. Burden is in quotes referring to the aforementioned purpose of HR 1084

<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*, 8-16.

the combat power demands to wage war in the future. By understanding what is decisive in COIN warfare, we reach a tipping point in the evolution to make sustainment units the decisive effort in the GWOT.<sup>61</sup>

## **What is decisive in winning the Global War on Terrorism?**

What is the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)? President George W. Bush, as many others, refers to the GWOT as an ideological war.<sup>62</sup> The description of counterinsurgency operations bears a similar description as a war of ideas.<sup>63</sup> We can then characterize the GWOT as a Global Counter Insurgency.<sup>64</sup> Consequently, by pursuing what is decisive in defeating an insurgency we are actually pursuing what is decisive in winning the GWOT. This is one of the reasons why COIN has gained renewed interest in the US Military. On the other hand, opposition to COIN as an army core competency exists. Laying out the facts to why these new changes are enduring validates the value of COIN's contemporary prevalence.

In academia, the national media, and within the Combined Arms Center of the US Army, counterinsurgency is a hot topic of discussion.<sup>65</sup> Nevertheless, this interest in COIN has not always been the case.<sup>66</sup> The military is just beginning to learn (relearn) the requirements of a counterinsurgent force. The placement of the Joint Army/USMC COIN Field Manual (FM 3-24)

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<sup>61</sup>Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point : How Little Things can make a Big Difference*, 1std ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 2000), 279. This is in keeping with the Gladwell definition.

<sup>62</sup>George Bush W, "The National Security Strategy of the United States," 1, no. 1 (March 16, 2006 2006): 1-54. , Brian G. Watson and Army War College . Strategic Studies Institute, *Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively : The Case for Greater Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 29. "the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder"

<sup>63</sup>US Army. *Field Manual no. 3-24*, 1-75. In the COIN Manual in Chapter 1. "Ideas are a motivating factor in insurgent activities. Insurgencies can gather recruits and a mass."

popular support through ideological appeal (including religious or other cultural identifiers)

<sup>64</sup>Hammes, "The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century," 321. 2. Colonel Hammes describes al Qaeda and 4th generation warfare as an "evolved insurgency"

<sup>65</sup>"United States Government Counterinsurgency Initiative(USG COIN)," in Joint Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International Development (USID) [database online]. Washington D.C. September 29, 2006 [cited 2007]. Available from <http://www.usgcoin.org/>.

<sup>66</sup>The last update on the COIN manual was in 1974



as “Keystone Doctrine” of Army Operations is significant.<sup>67</sup> By placing the COIN in this way, the Army is sending the message that COIN warfare is one of its core competencies.<sup>68</sup> The introduction of the manual summarizes this fact by stating it is time to “institutionalize our knowledge” of COIN.<sup>69</sup> It is time to learn counterinsurgency because as stated in *COE change #1*, insurgency is the tactic our enemy has chosen. If we want to defeat this enemy we must become better counterinsurgents. Today, there are many examples of the acceptance and rebuffing of COIN in our military and government.<sup>70</sup>

One argument against COIN is the “readiness issue”; or by focusing on the non-kinetic COIN operations, U.S. troops are unable to kinetically defend the nation.<sup>71</sup> This issue advocates that we can fail in COIN operations and still survive as a nation.<sup>72</sup> Conversely, failure in Major Combat Operations (MCO) once results in our nation perishing. Certainly, this has been true in the past but not so much today. Today, as described in the aforementioned *COE change #1: failed states matter*, failing in COIN once today can also lead to serious catastrophes and the perishing of our nation. Furthermore, is it possible that the readiness issue is a false dilemma? That in developing COIN warfare the military could actually enhance our nation’s ability to fight MCO. Specifically, in assigning these civil non-kinetic functions to combat sustainment units we can simultaneously enhance their ability to support future MCOs while preserving the combat arms units’ kinetic lethal competency. However, even after satisfying all the arguments against COIN warfare there will still be a historical denial of COIN in the military culture.

Lieutenant General (LTG) Peter Chiarelli, in his Military Review article *Winning the Peace:*

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<sup>67</sup>Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD), Combined Arms Center, "Brief on New COIN Doctrine FM 3-24 / MCRP 3-33.5," 1. keystone publications — Joint doctrine publications that establish the doctrinal foundation for a series of publications in the hierarchy of joint publications.

<sup>68</sup>Essentially, this measure has erased the old view that COIN is the ugly form of warfare we don’t do.

<sup>69</sup>US Army. *Field Manual no. 3-24*, The lead paragraph of the introduction states this fact.

<sup>70</sup>"USG COIN," September 29, 2006 [2007]..This one example of the COIN proliferation, another is the institutional source of this monograph, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Of the top 30 priority research topics the SAMS class of 2007 could chose from over 15 topics involve COIN.

<sup>71</sup>Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations*, (New York: Novinka, 2005), 81. 3 The readiness issue is one of opportunity cost; or the cost of not focusing on MCO. Specifically, the cost of focusing on the non-kinetic civil requirements of COIN is decreasing our ability to fight MCO.

<sup>72</sup> Farr, Sam and Saxton, Jim, "House Resolution 1084," This is the lead finding and purpose for the Stabilization and Reconstruction Act of 2007

*the Requirements of Full Spectrum Operations*, describes our military culture's reluctance to COIN. LTG Chiarelli describes his image of war as large sweeping armor formations interrupted by today's urgent reality of COIN.<sup>73</sup> His description personifies the greater organizational change occurring in the US military. This change is the reluctant transfer from MCO-only army to counterinsurgent warfare as our contemporary norm. General Chiarelli's description of a reluctant counterinsurgent is reminiscent of Roger Trinquier's 1964 publication *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*. Trinquier, a French army officer, begins his work by stating:

“Defined Since the end of World War II, a new form of warfare has been born. Called at times either subversive warfare or revolutionary warfare, it differs fundamentally from the wars of the past in that victory is not expected from the clash of two armies on a field of battle... (Yet) ...We still persist in studying a type of warfare that no longer exists and that we shall never sight again.”

Trinquier was correct about COIN as future warfare but incorrect in his statement that it's only “defined since the end of WWII.” A century and a half before WWII the downfall of the French Empire was due in large part to Napoleon's own reluctance to COIN warfare first in Italy and then in Spain.<sup>74</sup> Napoleon himself admits in his description of the Spanish Campaign/Insurgency causing the collapse of the French empire. He stated:

“That unfortunate war destroyed me; it divided my forces, multiplied my obligations, undermined my morale...All the circumstances of my disasters are bound up in that fatal knot.”<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>73</sup>Peter W. Chiarelli and Patrick R. Michaelis, "The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," *Military Review* 85, no. 4; 4 (07//Jul/Aug2005 2005): 4-17. LTG Chiarelli states: “I envisioned large sweeping formations...on the plains of Europe, or the deserts of the Middle East...But in Baghdad the envisioned 3-decade-old concept of reality was replaced by a far greater sense of purpose and cause.”

<sup>74</sup>Milton Finley, *The most Monstrous of Wars : The Napoleonic Guerrilla War in Southern Italy, 1806-1811*, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 161. Napoleon's first opportunity to learn the requirements COIN warfare was in southern Italy, during the Calabrian war of 1806-1811. The French easily occupied Naples, however, quickly lost control of the peasant-occupied Calabrian region. An insurgency ensued with British forces in direct support of the Calabrian guerillas. Although the Calabrians were ultimately defeated, the war resulted in the death of 20,000 French soldiers. The French success in this war was more due to the disorganization of the guerillas and lack of continued British external support than to the proficiency of French COIN tactics or strategy. Napoleon failed to apply the lesson Italy in his subsequent Spanish Campaign of 1804 to 1814.

<sup>75</sup>John Lawrence Tone, *The Fatal Knot : The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 239. Tone highlights this causal link of the

The fall of the Napoleonic era shows what happens to a country when its army ignores the requirements of COIN warfare. Nevertheless, in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century insurgencies did not directly threaten states beyond the borders of the host nation. Only a conventional army could threaten another nation in this way. Today, such insurgents (terrorists) armed with advanced off the shelf technologies can directly threaten a nation-state (and may have even given Napoleon pause). Therefore, since the GWOT is a global counterinsurgency, determining what is decisive in winning COIN is decisive in the GWOT. Are stability operations are decisive in COIN?

### **Stability Operations: Decisive in defeating an insurgency**

Stability operations encompass many possible subordinate missions. Thomas Barnett in his book *The Pentagon's New Map: Blueprint for Action*, describes the various missions it includes, such as: Stability and Support Operations (SASO); Post conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (SRO); Operations Other Than War (OOTW); Humanitarian assistance (HA); Disaster Relief (DR); and Low intensity Conflict (LIC).<sup>76</sup> Similarly, the US Military defines stability operations in *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 Joint Operations* as:

“an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”<sup>77</sup>

These definitions and various mission types discuss broadly the political, economic, and social requirements of stability operations. These sub-operations (or lines of operations) are synonymous with what many military theorists describe as decisive in counterinsurgency warfare. Well known COIN theorists such as David Galula, Roger Trinquier,<sup>78</sup> Sir Robert Thompson,<sup>79</sup>

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Spanish Campaign; however, the Russian offensive combined with the troop requirements in Spain was the true downfall of the Napoleon Era

<sup>76</sup>Barnett, Thomas P.M. 2004, 112

<sup>77</sup>United States Joint Doctrine Command, *JP 1.02 Joint Publications: Operations Terms*, (Fort Belvoir, Virginia: United States Joint Doctrine Directorate, 2001), 323-N/A. 504.

<sup>78</sup>Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare : A French View of Counterinsurgency*, (New York: Praeger, 1964), 115. 43. Trinquier statement on the political primacy of COIN: “A broad social program follows, the

Anthony Joes,<sup>80</sup> and Bart O'Neil,<sup>81</sup> all address the requirements of stability operations as essential in defeating an insurgency.

In his work, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, David Galula described an insurgency through his experience in French Indochina and in Algeria. He prescribed strategic, operational, and tactical methods to defeat an insurgency. Galula states that there is a transition from focus on destroying a guerilla force to gaining the cooperation and support of the populace. The counterinsurgent must first "expel" an insurgent force's then in the second step deploy a static unit. The static (paraphrased stabilization) unit is deployed "to gain popular support" and begin "civic action at the lowest level."<sup>82</sup> Here Galula described the civic actions as political, social, and economic. Galula stated:

"To confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be done, and nobody else is available to undertake them, would be senseless. The soldier must then be prepared to become...a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout. But only for as long as he cannot be replaced, for it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians."<sup>83</sup>

This statement acknowledges the emergent need for delivering public goods as a method of legitimizing the host nation government. Moreover, soldiers should only provide these goods if

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objective of which is to give the people the material and moral assistance necessary to permit them to resume their normal activities quickly after operations are over."

<sup>79</sup>Robert Grainger Ker Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency; the Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam*, (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1966), 171. 112. Sir Robert Thompson. In his work *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam*, 1966. Thompson describes the objective of COIN closer to that of US Military stability operations. "...the object [is to]...restore government authority in an area and establish a firm security framework.... "Winning" the population can tritely be summed up as good government in all its aspects....All this helps to give the impression not only that the government is operating for the benefit of the people, but that it is carrying out programs of a permanent nature...It gives people a stake in stability and hope for the future...." Additionally, Thompson stated: "More desirable than outright gifts are schemes which are self-perpetuating or encourage a chain reaction. For example, building plans should stimulate the production of local building material."

<sup>80</sup>Anthony James Joes, *Resisting Rebellion : The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*, (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 351. 223. Joes States: "The ultimate method of counterinsurgency is to prevent an insurgency from arising in the first place. And the best preventative is an effective government that offers a peaceful path to change, that is, a recognized method of seeking redress of grievances."

<sup>81</sup>Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts, *Insurgency in the Modern World*, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), 291, 125. O'Neil states: "Of all the variables that have a bearing on the progress or outcome of an insurgencies, none is more important than government response."

<sup>82</sup>David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, (New York: Praeger, 1964), 143. 110.

<sup>83</sup>*Ibid.*, 88.

the host government does not possess its own capacity.<sup>84</sup>

Galula and other early COIN theorists discuss the reoccurring theme of restoring good government to gain popular support as the ends and security as one of the various means. This reoccurring theme is certainly tantamount to the military definition of stability operations. Has this view been continued by contemporary theorists? Recent works of LTG Chiarelli, Thomas Barnett, and LTG David Petraeus describe the logic of stability operations as decisive to COIN warfare.

The aforementioned LTG Chiarelli's *Military Review* article identifies stability lines of operations as decisive and predominates that of kinetic operations.<sup>85</sup> He categorizes these stability lines of operations into providing essential services, establishing economic pluralism, and assisting in governance.<sup>86</sup> He further reduces *essential services* into the categories of Security, Water, Electricity, Academics, Transportation Network, Medical, and Sanitation (SWEAT-MS).<sup>87</sup> Where early COIN theorists placed security first then stability operations second; LTG Chiarelli qualifies stability measures importance by placing them as equals with combat action. Espousing a simultaneous requirement of these essential services applies an understanding of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs of the physiological before that of safety.<sup>88</sup> Logic then forces the question: how does the HR 1084-civilian response corps implement stability operations in an environment where security has not been established?

LTG Petraeus answers this question and continues the idea of stability as decisive in his

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<sup>84</sup>Some revisionists may misinterpret this statement as civilians in general. However, Galula is specifically describing the civilians of the host nation not civilians of external countries.

<sup>85</sup>Chiarelli and Michaelis, 13. LTG Chiarelli states: "*Kinetic operations would provide the definable short-term wins we are comfortable with as an Army but, ultimately, would be our undoing. ...No longer is it acceptable to think sequentially through stability operations and support operations by believing that if you first establish the security environment, you can work sequentially toward establishing critical infrastructure and governmental legitimacy then drive toward economic independence.*" Additionally he adds: "*In the best case, we would cause the insurgency to grow. In the worst case, although we would never lose a tactical or operational engagement, the migration of fence-sitters to the insurgent cause would be so pronounced the coalition loss in soldiers and support would reach unacceptable levels*"

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., 10-15.

<sup>87</sup>US Army. *Field Manual no. 3-24*, 5-15.

<sup>88</sup>Abraham H. Maslow and Robert Frager, *Motivation and Personality*, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 293.

Military Review article, *Learning Counterinsurgency: 14 Observations from Soldiering in Iraq*.

All of his observations show a tendency towards the decisive role stability operations have in the defeat of an insurgency. However, the observation that perhaps brings this out more than others is *observation number 7. Everyone must do nation building*. Within the context of addressing the limitations of civil affairs (CA) units LTG Petraeus describes how he augmented CA teams with functional specialists from the sustainment and support units within his division.<sup>89</sup> Another interesting aspect of this observation is in the context it was witnessed. The insurgencies within Iraq and northern Mosul were in the gestation period in the early summer months of 2003.<sup>90</sup> The 101<sup>st</sup> was conducting more preventive than counter insurgency measures. LTG Petraeus echoes Anthony Joes' theory that providing good government is the best way of defeating an insurgency (by preventing it from ever occurring).<sup>91</sup>

The similarity between the definition of *stability operations* and what military theorists define as decisive in COIN operations is not coincidental. Clearly, both contemporary and classic military theorists agree that stability operations are decisive in defeating and/or preventing an insurgency. Furthermore, these theorists define the relationship of state-building, stability and COIN operations as not mutually exclusive.<sup>92</sup> In other words, stability operations are decisive in COIN warfare, and state-building is the higher form of stability operations to prevent

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<sup>89</sup>Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq," 2-12. LTG Petraeus states: "For example, our Signal Battalion incorporated the Civil Affairs Battalion's communications team and worked with the Ministry of Telecommunications element Works, the Division Support Command with the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Corps Support Group with the Ministry of Education, the Military Police Battalion with the Ministry of Interior (Police), our Surgeon and his team with the Ministry of Health, our Staff Judge Advocate with Ministry of Justice officials, our Fire Support Element with the Ministry of Oil, and so on. In fact, we lined up a unit or staff section with every ministry element and with all the key leaders and officials in our AOR, and our subordinate units did the same in their areas of responsibility. By the time we were done, everyone and every element, not just Civil Affairs units, were engaged in nation-building." in northern Iraq, ... Our Chaplain and his team linked with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Engineer Battalion with the Ministry of Public

<sup>90</sup>Senate Armed Service Committee, Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, USANominee to be General and Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, 1st sess., Feb 2007 2007, 1.

<sup>91</sup>Joes, 351.

<sup>92</sup>Barnett, Thomas P.M. 2004, 435.



insurgencies from (re)occurring.<sup>93</sup>

This chapter has demonstrated critical changes in our operating environment that enable the *Theory of Stability*. These changes have only recently transpired since 9/11 but equate to durable evolutionary steps. Specifically, they are not suspect of reverting to status quo due to political cycle changes in the upcoming years. Moreover, by identifying stability operations as decisive in winning the global counterinsurgency, known as the GWOT, we can identify what is the decisive effort. Specifically, what organization has inherent capabilities to deliver while simultaneously defending civil essential services against an insurgency armed with terrorism?

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<sup>93</sup>The Joes, Petraeus, and Thompson arguments on good governance being the death of insurgency characterizes nation (state)-building as preventive or anti-insurgency operations.

## **CHAPTER TWO: The Theory of Stability Power: *Analysis and Concept of Employment***

Logisticians hate football analogies describing combat. The reason why is there are no positions on the football field that describe what logisticians do in combat. The closest positions analogous to logisticians are the bus drivers, the personal trainers, the emergency medical team, and the water “personnel.” In combat today, logisticians are clearly team players on the field directly in harm’s way. The theory of stability power positions combat logisticians and engineers as the entire defensive football team. The purpose here is not parochial promotion of the logistical and engineer corps. By contrast, the purpose is to harness key theories to enable the designing of an analytical tool to determine what organization is more or less effective in stability operations. After objectively determining what organizations possess the most relative stability power, we can then identify how to employ such operations. Such power that is decisive in COIN warfare and in winning the GWOT.

Stability Power is an abstract concept. More specifically, it does not exist in any other literature or military doctrine.<sup>94</sup> Therefore, various interrelated theories greatly assist in developing this new method of analysis and employment of stability power. Stability Power is for the most part a derivative of theories and subject matter pertaining to nation (state) building, complex decision-making, political science, systems theory, counterinsurgency, policing models and military logistical estimates. The next few pages will define the theory of stability power, relative stability power analysis, and employing of stability power to prevent state failure.

### **The Theory of Stability Power: The Requirement of Self Securing Elements of National Power**

Stability Power is the harmonious combination of soft and hard power engaged in stabilizing

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<sup>94</sup> At the time this monograph was published stability power refers to the maintaining of a constant voltage through a dynamic power system.

a respective failing(ed) state.<sup>95</sup> In describing stability power, we are simultaneously describing the requirements of any force employed to conduct stability operations. Generalizing the requirements of a stabilization and reconstruction force into a single mission statement would sound something like: *A contingency based team projecting and self-securing all the elements of national power in proportions relative to the scale of the intervention.*<sup>96</sup> This section will present the theory of stability power by dissecting this mission statement from back to front.

The topic typically missing in the dialogue of state building is where on the scales of intervention the US is projecting its elements of nation power.<sup>97</sup> The Army's Full Spectrum Operations Manual depicts operations ranging between stable-peace to general war.<sup>98</sup> Figure 1 depicts this spectrum with increasing measures of security and immediacy as the intervention moves from peace to war.<sup>99</sup> In peacetime engagements, the soft power elements of diplomacy and information outweigh that of the hard power elements of military and economics.<sup>100</sup> Moving away from peace operations there is a balancing of this hard and soft power. This is the first requirement of a stability and reconstruction force: to have balanced representation of all elements of national power relative to the scale of intervention down to the lowest level.

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<sup>95</sup>Nye, 191. The contradiction between combat and stability operations is synonymous to the differences between hard and soft power as addressed by Joseph S. Nye in his book *Soft Power*, the means to success in world politics. Mr. Nye defines hard power as the coercive or command authority derived from military and economic arms of national power and soft power as the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. Mr. Nye states: "Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others...it is the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence."


<sup>96</sup>The elements of nation power are Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics (DIME).

<sup>97</sup>Fukuyama *Nation Building*, *Winning the Peace*, and *Winning the Hearts and Minds* are three books written under essential by the same authors expressing this theme of nation-building as Department of State function without discussing in details of the operational environment where this DoS Force is attempting to function.

<sup>98</sup>United States. Dept. of the Army, *FM 3-0 U.S. Army Full Spectrum Operations (DRAG); Field Manual no. 3.0*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027: Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, JAN 2007 DRAFT), 323-N/A. 30. This is also in Joint Publication 3-0. Figure 2 depicts this spectrum as a scale of intervention along the x-axis and the typical lead agency along the y-axis. LTC (RET) Ken Long of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth suggested this idea of applying a scale to the spectrum of conflict.

<sup>99</sup>This may even prove to forgiving as any American operating outside the US is targeted by AQ

<sup>100</sup>Nye, 191.



**Figure 1 Scales of Intervention**

Why must each individual member of such a stability and reconstruction force be able to operate at the lowest level in all these scales of intervention?<sup>101</sup> These stability and reconstruction operators provide essential “means of verification” of how the state building is progressing.<sup>102</sup> Simply put, these individuals cannot provide Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC) on countrywide projects armed with a set of binoculars on the rooftop of a hotel in the capital city.<sup>103</sup> This is the second requirement of a stability and reconstruction force: the necessity of skilled individuals maintaining constant interaction with the respective system or service it is monitoring / providing.<sup>104</sup> Moreover, their skills in the deliverance of essential

<sup>101</sup>On 14 March 2004 LTG Petraeus walking the streets of Anbar province in Iraq exhibiting this fact.

<sup>102</sup> Norway. Direktoratet for utviklingshjelp, *The Logical Framework Approach (LFA) : Handbook for Objectives-Oriented Project Planning*, (Norway: NORAD, Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation, 1990), 107. Logframework Approach (LFA) method was developed by Leon J. Rosenberg, under contract to USAID in 1969, and discusses this crucial means of verification

<sup>103</sup>This is a direct reference to the media observation post on the Palestine hotel in Baghdad

<sup>104</sup>Dietrich Dörner, *The Logic of Failure : Why Things Go Wrong and what we can do to make them Right*, 1st American ed. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 222. Pg 86,86 in this work Dorner explores this lack of understanding the total system of systems in the side of one action can have multiple undesired outcomes in different venues. Dorner states on pg 86: They (the members of a force conducting a foreign intervention) did not take into account the side effects and repercussions of certain measures. They dealt with the entire system, not as a system but as a bundle of independent mini-systems. And dealing with systems this way breeds trouble.

services must be at a level that they can effectively QA/QC without inadvertently creating harmful second and third order effects. Consequently, then next logic question is: how does a *civilian response corps* secure the deliverance of a public good from insurgent interdiction?

Thomas Barnett presents a vision of such a stability force and attempts to answer this question. He calls this force the SYS-ADMIN or system administrators.<sup>105</sup> According to Barnett the SYS ADMIN requires the Leviathan force to secure it when the operating in non-permissive environments.<sup>106</sup> Similarly, HR 1084's new 250 active members *civil response corps* will also require a like symbiotic leviathan relationship. However, dividing the function of security at the operational level of war between a stability force and the military is overly redundant and is not realistic as discussed in *COE change #2*. Any force operating in interventions beyond peacetime permissive environments must have internal and local security at the individual level.<sup>107</sup>

Moreover, as described in *COE change #2*, such a force must have the internal capability to access a line of communication that integrates all echelons of military power to bear upon an armed adversary. This is the third requirement of a stability and reconstruction force: it must self secure all the elements of national power in the proportions respective to the intervention down to the individual level.

The final requirement is the time constraint of such operations, and defines the relationship between the words "*contingency*" and "*projection*." These two words in the initial generalized mission statement represent the element of time and availability or broadly the "when."<sup>108</sup> The crucial period of post crisis interventions is hard to define to a day, or moment in time. However, at this point the failing host country is not unlike a patient in an emergency room fighting off a

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<sup>105</sup>Barnett, Thomas P.M. 2004, 15. In Barnett's description the SYS-ADMIN can operate autonomously only in interventions with permissive environments.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid.

<sup>107</sup>Fontenot, *On Point*, 539.

<sup>108</sup>Dörner, 222. Dörner states: "What is true right now is not really so important as what will or could happen. In a time configuration, the characteristics of development are much more revealing than the status quo. But when we are dealing with a developing situation we often fail to understand that we had better focus on how that situation unfolds rather than on its status at the moment."

deadly virus.<sup>109</sup> This is a “golden” minute, hour, week, or month that a stability and reconstruction force has to respond and treat the nation-state-patient. The word contingency defines the time constraint that requires a standing unit unaffected by the crisis, deployable within no-warning circumstances.

Thomas Barnett suggests growing the SYS-ADMIN from the first responders of this country.<sup>110</sup> Barnett is not just attempting to harness their individual expertise in crisis response but also the organizational culture of their former professions.<sup>111</sup> The organizational culture that is similar to a hybrid of firefighters in New York City and the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division at Fort Bragg. It is an organizational culture that facilitates “direct assignment” of its members to secure a country populated by millions, many who do not like Americans.<sup>112</sup> No other governmental agency possesses the contingency capability or this organization culture and requires creating it from scratch or recruiting (stealing) it from the Department of Defense.<sup>113</sup> Nevertheless, the expertise that such first responders possess is also important and another area HR 1084 does not address.

A deployable ready force is not just personnel but also materiel staged and configured for global projection to stabilize a failing nation. An initial response to post conflict/crisis environment requires the immediate resumption of “essential” public goods.<sup>114</sup> Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, from physiological through self-actualization assists in communicating what

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<sup>109</sup>US Army. *Field Manual no. 3-24* This analogy was used in a previous draft of this manual.

<sup>110</sup>Barnett, Thomas P.M. 2004, Former police officers, soldiers, municipal managers are some of the first responders Barnett is referring.

<sup>111</sup>Cook, 59. The word profession is not used lightly. As described Martin Cook it is even more than the “Abbott’s Model.” It is an embodiment of culture that allows for the unlimited liability clause (or the understanding of the requirements self sacrifice.)

<sup>112</sup>“*Directed Assignment*” is the term describing when foreign area officers of the state department receive an assignment without consent or volunteer status. This is called orders in the military enforced by the UCMJ, for failure to comply, subject to prosecution and time in the disciplinary facility (prison).

<sup>113</sup>An example of this “creation from scratch” is in the efforts of the US State Department to field Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. These essential PRTs are comprised of mostly US service members and brave individuals from USAID and the DoS who volunteer for the assignments in these hostile environments.

<sup>114</sup>CSIS and Orr, 343. This publication is the source of the essential task list the State Department uses to identify the essential tasks of a post conflict crisis environment. This list divides tasks temporally from initial response to fostering sustainability. This monograph suggest the initial response requires an organizational culture only evident in DoD.



is essential versus critical.<sup>115</sup> Essential services are in the bottom levels of satisfying the physiological and safety needs. The services described as critical fall into these remaining higher Maslow levels. Deliverance of drinking water, public health, food, safety and electrical power are some of the base essential services requiring immediate restoration. Such a stability force will require contingency equipment and materiel capable of providing these services in austere terrain until such time the host country is self-sustaining.

The aforementioned mission statement summarizes this stability power theory into the four requirements. Analyzing the intensity of these requirements versus the respective agency capabilities determines which organization is more or less suited to stabilize a respective failing country. In this respect, military logistical and support units can adapt more rapidly than any other government agency to meet all the requirements of a stability and reconstruction force. Understanding the word “adapt” is important. It is important as these military sustainment and support units are only adapting. More specifically, they are making relatively small evolutionary changes to what they already perform for the military. The ability to adapt “rapidly” is significant because there is an immediate need for this force in today’s geo-political environment.<sup>116</sup> How an organization can effectively meet these four requirements defines its stability power. As discussed in the introduction, previous combat power analysis tools are useless in determining whether a unit exhibits more or less capacity to conduct what is decisive in counterinsurgency. A new model is required to determine relative stability power.

## **Analyzing Stability Power**

### **Introducing Relative Stabilization Power Analysis**

Since stability operations are decisive in GWOT then organizations that are best suited to

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<sup>115</sup>On a Maslow’s Scale of Physiological, Safety, Love, Esteem, and Self Actualization essential services fall in the bottom levels of satisfying the physiological and then safety needs. The services described as critical fall into these remaining higher levels.

<sup>116</sup>The additionally 250 plus member civilian response corps is an advancement in our country’s ability to conduct stability operations, however it is currently a pilot program and will take decades to develop into a effective force and may outlast its current political value.

conduct stability operations are the decisive efforts. The next logical question is how does the military analyze what units are more or less capable in stability operation? The short answer is that it does not. Intuitively, sustainment and combat support units have skill sets more transferable to conduct civic actions and deliverance of essential services. Nevertheless, objective proof of this intuition is required.

Throughout its history the US Military has informally used *relative combat power analysis* as a method to ensure the numbers of soldiers and equipment are appropriate to face off against an opponent. Today's US Military defines combat power analysis in its joint publications as the "*total means of destructive and or disruptive force that a military formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.*"<sup>117</sup> This definition hardly seems suitable when the center of gravity is popular support of a civil populace.<sup>118</sup> The US Army's manual on planning, FM 5-0, further describes this combat power analysis as "*a technique for comparing friendly strengths against enemy weakness, and vice versa, for each element of combat power.*"<sup>119</sup>

These definitions of combat power analysis and the techniques used to determine troop requirements seem counterintuitive when analyzing the non-kinetic, non-lethal, civic requirements of stability operations. FM 5-0 only begins to approach the complexity of such analysis in planning for stability operations. It states when planning stability operations:

"...staffs often determine relative combat power by comparing available resources to the tasks assigned...in such operations, the elements of maneuver, non-lethal fires, leadership, and information may predominate."<sup>120</sup>

The interesting elements missing in this sole paragraph dedicated to analyzing stability operations are the elements of sustainment and or support functions.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>117</sup>US Joint Doctrine "JP 1.02," 123

<sup>118</sup> US Army. *Field Manual no. 3-24*, COIN Manual states this at least seven times

<sup>119</sup>United States Army, *FM 5-0 Field Manual Planning and Orders Production*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027: Headquarters United States Army, 2005 January), 201-N/A. Additionally, Appendix B displays an example of the US Army's formula called Correlation of Forces and Means (CoFMs).

<sup>120</sup>*Ibid.*, 3-33.

<sup>121</sup>It is possible the author of this paragraph includes sustainment within the non-lethal fires element. However, this does not do justice the complex analysis requirements of stability operations nor the capability sustainment unit's can contribute.

Figure 2 depicts these missing elements in an example of analyzing the requirements of

Comparison of Units Stability Assets						
Civil Service	Military Specialist / Capability	SRS BDE	HBCT	IBCT	S&CT	ACR
Police	Military Police	160	49	42	1	0
	Criminal Investigation Detective	6	0	0	0	0
	Military Intelligence	79	73	77	79	103
Fire	Military Firefighters	12	0	0	0	0
Water	Quatermaster Water Specialist	32	27	14	10	14
	Gallons of Water Purified From Salt Water per Day	316,000	24,000	24,000	24,000	48,000
	Gallons of Water Purified From Fresh Water per Day	360,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	72,000
	Gallons Stored and Distributed per day	176,000	48,000	20,000	18,000	60,000
	Plumbers	30	0	0	0	0
Electricity	Generation Repair Specialist	21	37	27	28	67
	Prime Power Production Specialist	8	0	0	0	0
	Transmission and Distribution Specialist	5	0	0	0	0
Schools	Public Education	3	0	0	0	0
Transportation Network	Transportation Officers / NCOs	142	9	11	6	4
	Circulation Control MP	3	0	0	0	0
	Road Construction Teams	3	2	7	2	3
	Wheeled Vehicle Repair	86	141	156	130	192
Communication	Communications Specialist	74	69	60	63	115
Medical	Surgeon / Physician	30	9	8	9	8
	Physician Assistant	11	9	7	10	9
	Nurse	26	1	1	1	1
	Dentist	4	1	1	1	1
	Total Health Care Worker	613	262	207	240	240
	Total Hospital Beds	120	20	20	20	20
	Total Trauma Treat Sections	10	5	5	5	6
	Total Ambulances	36	38	37	35	39
Sanitation	Preventive Medicine	4	1	1	1	0
Postal Operations	Postal Specialist	21	6	6	0	0
Food Supply	Food Storage and Preparation Specialist	98	101	98	97	127
	Total Person Capable of feeding per day	25,610	3,560	3,293	3,980	0
	Veterinary Food Inspection Specialist	32	0	0	0	0
Agriculture	Veterinary Corps Officer	9	0	0	0	0
	Veterinary Services Food Safety Technician	1	0	0	0	0
	Animal Care Spc	6	0	0	0	0
Fuel	Fuel Lab Specialist	63	138	59	30	192
	Receives, stores, issues, and distributes Total Gals	309,200	245,050	25,300	31,500	260,000
Civil Supply	Supply Specialist	60	99	98	86	116
	Procurement Specialist	68	93	78	58	177
	Total Goods By Stons Capability per Day	1,333	572	599	286	796
Financial	Acquisition Corps	1	0	0	0	0
	Finance Corps	1	0	0	0	0
	Finance Specialist	1	0	0	0	0
Population Census	Human Resource Specialists	51	35	42	68	62
Legal	Lawyers and Legal Specialist	12	9	9	7	18
Engineers	Horizontal / General Engineering	8	2	7	2	3
	Vertical Engineering	102	0	1	0	0
Total Number of Soldiers		4,182	3,746	3,444	3,980	4,525

Figure 2 Comparison of Stability Assets between brigades<sup>122</sup>

stability operations versus the capabilities of sustainment units.<sup>123</sup> By depicting these civil tasks

<sup>122</sup>These numbers are gathered from a combination of the logistical capabilities handbook and unit table of equipment and organizations (TOE)

juxtapose the military skills and capabilities of the various brigade's in the US Army, figure 2 demonstrates what units are more or less capable of stability operations. The Stability and Reconstruction Sustainment Brigade's (SRSB) exact organization is the topic of detailed discussion in chapter three.<sup>124</sup> However, the total number troops in each brigade are approximately 4,000 soldiers (plus or minus 200).<sup>125</sup>

To summarize, this chart depicts that with approximately the same number of troops, an SRSB possesses on average 350% greater stability power than the units that are currently conducting stability operations in OIF/OEF. This figure reveals the need to develop a better understanding of stability operations. The kinetic destructive models as described earlier (and in more detail in Appendix B) are indicative of a doctrinal void on how to analyze stability and COIN operations. Relative combat power analysis is the name of the previous kinetic models. The solution presented here is: Relative Stability Power Analysis. It is a model to determine not just how many troops; but also what type of forces are required to conduct peace waging operations. The irony of this internal struggle (between war and peace) is that the same capability, which permits the US military to wage war so decisively, could also allow it to effectively wage the peace. This capability exists in the combat support forces that sustain our military's operations at Olympic-athlete level performance.

### Relative Stability Power Analysis: A New Model

Relative stability power analysis contradicts the military's combat power analysis doctrine. This contradiction is symptomatic of the military's doctrinal void on determining force

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<sup>123</sup>O'Neill, *Insurgency in the Modern World*, 291. This figure displays the same civil service requirements as discussed in Table 8-2 (Civil affairs capabilities used by logisticians) of the new COIN Manual

<sup>124</sup>An SRSB is essentially a US Army sustainment brigade with the same military intelligence capabilities of a Brigade Combat Team (BCT), plus two sustainment support battalions, two National Guard infantry battalions, two 40-Bed Combat Support Hospitals, a Civil Affairs Battalion (minus) and a PSYOPs Battalion (minus).

<sup>125</sup>One major difference is the SRSB contains external logistics capabilities. Over two thirds of the assets in the SRSB are external logistics dedicated in direct support to a civilian population. All the other Brigade's logistical assets are required for internal logistics; or the logistics to support the soldiers within the respective organization.

requirements for “wage the peace?”<sup>126</sup> The military needs a new power analysis tool that scopes the problems of a stability operation and assesses the required proportions of national power relative to the scale of intervention. This stability analysis program must assess the respective initial operational environment of the host country. Specifically, it must determine the status of essential public services, the border security requirements, and the ethnic-cultural effects on the operations. Military affairs experts require such a program to justify not only how many troops are required in the “clear” and “hold” phases but also what assets are required to conduct the “build” phase. The purpose here is to present a model to answer these analytical requirements following a two-step process. The first step is to demonstrate the key differences between relative stability power analysis and previous models. The second step is to present this tool in a practical example in the next chapter to show how it can be helpful in determining the required number and type of forces.<sup>127</sup>

Relative Stability Power Analysis has three different aspects from previous force requirement models. First, in keeping with the discussion in chapter one, this model assumes stability lines of operations are decisive in COIN. Therefore, unlike any other model it focuses on ratios pertaining to deliverance of public goods. Ratios like *physicians per person*, *police per capita* and gallons of water per person per day are the ratios essential in stability power analysis. The second major difference is applying the detailed context of the operational environment to determine the scale of the intervention and the equivalent forces. It does this by focusing the System of System Analysis (SoSA) similar to what LTC Calverli suggests in his a CSI publication *Easier Said than Done*.<sup>128</sup> For example, this model improves the new COIN manuals 1:50

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<sup>126</sup>Barnett, Thomas P.M. 2004, 435.

<sup>127</sup>Appendix D displays relative stability analysis tool in much more detail and is referred to throughout this chapter. Additionally, stability power analysis is an evolving program.

<sup>128</sup>David P. Cavaleri, *Easier Said than done : Making the Transition between Combat Operations and Stability Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, 2005), 95. In this CSI publication LTC Cavaleri discusses the eight analytic questions you must ask in determining how a force must conduct occupation/stability operations. The eight questions help frame the problems surrounding the conduct of stability operations. These questions provide an example of focusing the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and informational (PMESII) environment of the country hosting the stability

population based ratio to also account for the dynamic factors of social, ethnic, and religious densities. This model changes the troop to population ratio respective of the historical effects of population demographic densities in previous COIN operations. Additionally, it accounts for the effects of demilitarization and complete removal of the national security assets on the troop requirements of a coalition force.<sup>129</sup>

The Third new aspect of this model includes both the requirements of *securing the environment*, and *securing the population*.<sup>130</sup> This model holistically discusses stability and security requirements as symbiotic operations rather than dividing the two conceptually. Specifically, it includes the requirements of securing the environment to deny the influence of external spoilers. The previously mentioned estimate, 1 troop to 50 person ratio only applies to controlling the population. This model delineates the difference between controlling the population and securing the population.<sup>131</sup> This model assumes that controlling a population (or human will) for a long duration is impossible. Securing a population still requires denying the enemy's influence on the population without the required troop intensive physical presence of control. Therefore, this model explores what indirect means an army possesses to secure a population from an insurgency?<sup>132</sup> The answer maybe found by rephrasing the question. How does a counterinsurgent deny the enemy's ability to assert his will on the population? Enabling

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operations. This focus is not to replace the operational net assessment but to extract only what is essentials to determine stability power and derive troop requirements.

<sup>129</sup>Gordon and Trainor, 603.

<sup>130</sup>Frederick Kagan W., *Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq; Phase I Report* (Iraq Planning Group, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 2007), 1, There are several theorists such as the aforementioned David Galula who refer to counterinsurgents responsibility to control the population.

<sup>131</sup>U.S. Army, *FM 1.02*, The US army defines the tasks control and secure in Field Manual 1.02 Operational Terms and Symbols as: "*control: a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy...secure. a tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action.*" The physical element in the definition of control does not exist in the definition of the task secure. Securing an objective only requires the ability to deny the enemy from asserting his will on this objective. By contrast, the task control requires the physical presence. Even in the most restrictive examples of human control, such as that exhibited in any US prison, can we see the futility of attempting to control a population.

<sup>132</sup>In terms of the population of the Chapter 5 FM 3-24 discusses the need for controlling the population through basic services. It states: "Enough non-military resources are available to effectively carry out all essential improvements needed to provide basic services and control the population."



the civilian populace to deny the will of enemy is one answer. Another method is by blocking external spoilers such as foreign fighter's and foreign political organization's influence over the host country. Therefore, stability power analysis assesses the requirements of securing the operational environment from regional external spoilers and securing the population from internal insurgent influence.

Relative stability power analysis is a hybrid of systems theory models, the military's logistical estimate model, and the relative combat power analysis tool. By satisfying the essential elements of information, this model can subtract the requirements of a specific stability operation from the capabilities of the coalition to determine possible shortfalls. These essential elements of information are: focused assessment of the initial operational environment; mission and objective assessment; rival assessment; time constraints assessment; and assets available. After satisfying these elements, we can quantifiably layout the requirements of a stability operation relative to the operational environment. Requirements in the deliverance and improvements of essential services are the result of this analysis.

Analysis of the status of essential services facilitates defining what types of troops are required. Readily available ratios such as *Physician to Person*, *Teacher to Person*, and *Hospital-Bed per 1000 persons* help to determine personnel requirements. Infrastructure status including: number of type of schools, electric consumption, and access to water and sanitation, all facilitate measures of essential services known as SWEAT-MS.<sup>133</sup> Understanding the capacity of the host country versus a similar benchmark country we can identify realistic performance requirements for the coalition stability and reconstruction operations.

Using the country of Jordan as a benchmark vis-à-vis Iraq applies a regional standard to define a realistic level of service.<sup>134</sup> Regional benchmarking, as opposed to mirror imaging an

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<sup>133</sup>US Army. *Field Manual no. 3-24*,

<sup>134</sup>This model facilitates easily switching a benchmark standard from Jordan to Iran to Saudi Arabian or any other country by scrolling through a country list. Additionally, we apply different country benchmarks for different services.



unrealistic western standard, provides more achievable pragmatic goals/requirements.<sup>135</sup> These requirements minus the coalition's capabilities will determine shortfalls. This logistical estimate method of requirements-capability-shortfall is at the heart of relative stability analysis.<sup>136</sup> Applying this logistical technique to analyzing essential services determines what organization more effectively meets the requirements relative to a respective failing country. However, the overwhelming requirements of any failing state typically will exceed the capabilities of any stability force.

For that reason, communicating exact shortfalls is essential in harnessing interagency participation. This program uses statistics of well known global information resources such as the World Health Organization, UN Habitat, USAID, CIA fact book, Jane's Sentential report, The Encyclopedia of Global Populations and Demographics, and more. By using these common statistical resources, this model can assist Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Privately Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in justifying aid programs in the respective host country.

This program allows experts in military affairs to provide our civilian leadership a more quantifiable justification to not just how many troops, but what type of troops are needed.<sup>137</sup> In addition, these military affairs experts can now quantifiably determine the requirements of stability operations in relation to the operational environment. Placing these requirements against the capabilities of the coalition determines operational shortfalls. A shortfall in military capability translates into requests for additional enablers from governmental and non-governmental organizations. However, relative stability power analysis only empirically

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<sup>135</sup>Dörner, 222. Stability power analysis as tempered by Dorner's theories needs to maintain a holistic analysis and plan that forecasts side effects both in the short, mid, and long term. Additionally, Dorner advocates a reserve to mitigate uncertainty by maintaining contingency assets to deal with the unexpected. Finally, Dorner espouse forecasts based on trend analysis to depict urgency of need and subsequent prioritization of limited assets.

<sup>136</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, *TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR THE FORWARD SUPPORT BATTALION*, ed. Combined Arms Support Command Doctrine Directorate, 1d ed. (Fort Lee, Virginia: CASCOM, 2002), 231.

<sup>137</sup>Petraeus, David, H. Lieutenant General, "Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, USANominee to be General and Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq," 1-27. 15.

describes what a stability force would need to do in said host country. How does a military sustainment unit operate in the contemporary operational environment to exploit its inherent stability power advantages in the deliverance of essential public goods?

## Theories that enable the Employment of a Stability Force

As theory of stability power requires a new analytical model, it also requires a new concept of employment. A concept of operations employing stability power is a hybrid of subject matter on counterinsurgency, crisis response, and domestic policing. In keeping with LTG Petraeus' aforementioned observation number 7 "everyone does nation-building" this is way of meeting his intent on an even higher plane.

David Galula, author of *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, presents his concepts of the *Static force* and *Multiplicity* as a strategy of employing military units in COIN. Galula states a static force of infantry squads makes contact with the host country inhabitants by "living among the population...where it is not safe or of purely military value...linked to and enabling the local civilian authority."<sup>138</sup> Synthesizing Galula's static force concept with the theory of stability power provides a concept of employing a stability force securing and providing civil essential services. Known as "combat outposts" (COP) these micro-operating bases comprise of service-members skilled in civil functions (as described in figure 1) joined with security personnel.<sup>139</sup> Together these service members become members of a Combat Stability and Sustainment Outpost (CSSOP). These various CSSOPs networked across a population center become mutually supporting combined arms teams with forward (artillery) observers, a Tactical Human Intelligence Team (THT), and combat sustainment capabilities.<sup>140</sup> Charging the static

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<sup>138</sup>Galula, 111. Galula advocates a static force (specifically infantry squads) embedded with a local community.

<sup>139</sup>U.S. Army, *FM 1.02*. This FM defines a combat outpost as: A reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations. See also counter reconnaissance. A security force established at the regimental (brigade) level during defensive or stationary operations.

<sup>140</sup>For example: a military water treatment section securing local water treatment facility; a prime power section augmented with generator mechanics at a local power plant; military police collocated at a local police precinct; military fire fighter collocated with the local fire station; and so on until we simultaneously

force with subject matter experts and materiel respective to the public service expands this multiplicity strategy, exponentially.

Galula also discusses how these static forces create an element of multiplicity when they operate in conjunction with a separate mobile force.<sup>141</sup> In terms of operational relationship, the static force is building a partnership with civil authorities thus requiring longer tours of duty; while the mobile force, securing vast rural/suburban areas facilitate shorter tours.<sup>142</sup> More importantly, this mobile force secures the environment around static force's operation to secure the population center.<sup>143</sup> This symbiotic relationship mitigates the risk of a stability force operating in several smaller decentralized CSSOPs.<sup>144</sup> How will a sustainment brigade operating as a stability and reconstruction unit command and control (C2) such a decentralized operation?

One theory on domestic policing known as COMPSTAT provides a C2 solution. In the publication, *The COMPSTAT Paradigm*, author Vincent Henry chronicles the effectiveness of this new model in reducing New York City crime in the 1990s. It is a model that employs every municipal worker to the cause of security (much as the intent of the CSSOPs). Two key concepts of this book stand out as significant in how to C2 this decentralized stabilization force concept. The first is the collaborative COMPSTAT meeting and the second is the theory of *Broken Windows*.

Rudolph Giuliani's autobiography *Leadership*, highlights the COMPSTAT meeting as a key reason for successfully reducing crime in New York City. Both Henry's and Giuliani's

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secure the continued deliverance of civil essential services while locally denying insurgents freedom of movement. Continued synthesis of Galula's static force concept with modern day enablers include augmenting these CSSOPs with internal logistical support to maintain 24/7 operations so the soldiers are not parasitically living off of the community.

<sup>141</sup>Galula, 87 Strategy of Multiplication

<sup>142</sup>The conclusion that the static (SRO) forces will require longer than one year tours of duty is a difficult but necessary conclusion. The time to maintain "the continuum of essential services" demands consideration of continuity through 2 year tours. However, the mobile force requiring very little interaction could require only a 7 month standard tour.

<sup>143</sup>Relative stability power analysis accounts for this by defining a border as opposition, apathetic and allied, with increasing border guard and customs agents at crossing sites respective to this categorization.

<sup>144</sup>Barnett, Thomas P.M. 2004, Galula's mobile force is the aforementioned leviathan that Thomas Barnett was referring. Screening the suburban and rural regions is to also ensure that insurgents can not mass and overmatch the static stabilization force in the urban regions.

description of this meeting recognize the shortfalls of previous statistics and performance metrics used to analyze crime. Giuliani states that “statistics cover only the crimes that police know have occurred.”<sup>145</sup> Therefore, the essential part of the New York COMPSTAT meeting was designing the statistics to be current enough to assist in evaluating the performance of the police rather than the criminals. Furthermore, by meeting daily with all key precinct commanders and representatives of other agencies such as sanitation, and transit authorities they harnessed the entire municipal work force in crime prevention.<sup>146</sup> However, different from the New York meeting, the physical presence of all key individuals is not feasible in an insurgency environment. Collaborative communication technologies circumvent this constraint.<sup>147</sup> The meeting was only half of the reason for reducing crime in New York. The second half was how the statistics of the meeting were collected using the theory of *broken windows*.

The theory of *broken windows* is that little things can be the tipping point.<sup>148</sup> Not enforcing the rule of law even on something as simple as a broken window can lead to increasing crime overall. In places like Iraq, the *broken windows* theory has a different synthesis than on the streets of New York. By employing stability power in securing these key municipal public services, the coalition members interface at a new level with the local communities. Information collection that permits coalition members to learn what these “little important things” are in Iraq. Community transportation, utility repair, hospitals, schools, these are essential services but also chokepoints of intelligence that are not being accessed in this manner today. Imagine if every Iraqi bus and taxi driver was an informant with radio communications to a CSSOP/bus terminal

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<sup>145</sup> Rudolph W. Giuliani and Ken Kurson, *Leadership*, 1st ed. (New York: Hyperion, 2002), 72. , Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service and Richard F. Grimmett, "Authorization for use of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks (P.L. 107-40)," RS22357 (2006): 6.

<sup>146</sup> Vincent E. Henry, *The COMPSTAT Paradigm: Management Accountability in Policing, Business, and the Public Sector*, (Flushing, NY: Looseleaf Law Publications, 2002), 354. , Brian McAllister Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902*, (Chapel Hill ; London: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), xiii,258.

<sup>147</sup> Such technologies as Command Post of the Future (CPOF) and other Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) facilitate the attendance of every the key leaders while simultaneously maintaining the their physical presence at the CSSOP.

<sup>148</sup> Gladwell, "The Tipping Point: How Little Things can make a Big Difference," 279.

working to disrupt insurgent freedom of movement<sup>149</sup> What if medical CSSOPs secured every public hospital in the host country facilitating the investigation of every act of violence that enters the ER?<sup>150</sup> Establishing local ground level partnerships with the community harnesses the statistical power of COMPSTAT and allows for prioritization of resources.<sup>151</sup> Moreover, by ensuring the undisturbed deliverance of essential public goods the coalition simultaneously promotes the legitimacy of the host country's civil authority. Some call this a measure of diplomacy.

Rear Admiral (RADM) William Vanderwagen, the US Assistant Deputy Secretary of Crisis and Response, describes delivering the essential service of public health as health diplomacy. In his article *Health Diplomacy: Winning the Hearts and Minds through the use of Health Interventions* RADM Vanderwagen describes combating insurgency through providing public health to the populace. He describes the emergent nature of the health interventions in the "Geopolitical environment" as a way of defeating an insurgency. Additionally, he states: "we must deploy and use our health assets as an active element of intervention to resolve chaos and social instability."<sup>152</sup> He expands this idea during an interview by saying, "We have to figure out how to empower civilian authority, on this point I see correlations between Indonesia, Iraq, and even Katrina."<sup>153</sup> The *Theory of Stability Power* expands his view of health intervention across logistical, justice, and engineer functions, for the same purpose and intent. It is not just health diplomacy but logistical, justice, and engineering diplomacy.

After analyzing the theories that assist in employing stability power a similarity stands out.

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<sup>149</sup>Imagine if we could statistically track the reoccurrence of IEDs on a respective bus driver's route and were able to hold him accountable for not reporting what statistically he must have witnessed.

<sup>150</sup>Just as in NY City.

<sup>151</sup>Resources such as a mobile quick reaction force to action the Intel through nightly raids on identified insurgent cells. By securing these essential service at these key chokepoints, US forces are able to simultaneously provide security and a public service.

<sup>152</sup>Vanderwagen, William, "Health Diplomacy: Winning Hearts and Minds through the use of Health Interventions," *Military Medicine* 171 (2006/10/Oct2006 Supplement : 3-4. Furthermore, he states, "To establish a secure future, the governance of the environment must meet the needs of the population it serves or it will not be viewed as legitimate."

<sup>153</sup>Vanderwagen, William, "Interview with Rear Admiral Craig Vanderwagen; the US Assistant Deputy Secretary of Crisis and Response," *Military Medicine Health Diplomacy*, no. Fall 2006 (2006, December 27).

All these theories advocate lower level interaction of the intervening forces with the population. Today, soldiers call it: “breaking up the FOB and living with the people.” However, a concept employing only security assets to COPs with only the short term objectives of disrupting an insurgency is potentially harming the long term objectives of legitimacy.<sup>154</sup> Specifically, employing only security forces they can become parasitic in nature and wear out their welcome. By employing sustainment units to conduct Galula’s static force, the military simultaneously achieves the goal of lower tactical interaction while not becoming a forging parasite. It does this by building a network of CSSOPs in a skeletal structure securing and delivering all the SWEAT-MS public goods (and not just the S).

It actually is not a skeletal structure as much as an exo-skeletal structure of combat outpost. By placing military specialists in oversight of these key public services, the military simultaneously secures them from insurgent interdiction while providing quality control/assurance over them. Additionally, this exoskeletal structure facilitates the “pile on” of other enablers to operate in safety at the lowest level. Enablers like NGOs, PVOs and interagency aid organizations (such as HR1084s- *Civilian Response Corps*) benefiting from the security of the coalition while projecting their crucial aid at the lowest level. This chapter discussed the key theories that provide the concept of how to analyze and how employ stability power. The next chapter will test and evaluate this theory by putting it in northern Iraq.

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<sup>154</sup>Dörner, "The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and what we can do to make them Right," 222. Dorner speaks directly to the pitfalls of interventions ascribed in this monograph and its potential catastrophic failures due to undesired side effects. Mr. Dorner analyses the results of a gaming simulations that empowers individuals over the fate of a fictional third world country. With virtually no limits to resources, these individuals engage on projects with the sole goal of improving the well being of the citizens of this notional country. Amazingly even something as the eradication of a species of fly that carries a harmful disease, or an improvement to a water resource, as played out in this simulation, leads to overpopulation of cattle, famine, and other catastrophes. It shows the importance of establishing a detailed understanding of the goals and sub-goals in order to avoid what Dorner describes as Repair Service Behavior. This behavior exhibits the western desire to search out and fix any malfunctioning system just because you can. By contrast, the intervening agent must understand the entire complex adaptive system before intervention.

## CHAPTER THREE: Putting the Model in Iraq

Never in the history of warfare has an army deliberately put its logistical trains in the lead as the decisive element to defeat an enemy. The theory that logistical units can move to the forefront and be decisive in COIN warfare is a unique concept. To date the only other reference that asserts this idea is the US Military's new COIN manual.<sup>155</sup> The purpose here is to expand on the theories previously discussed and present the advantages and disadvantages in employing a Stability & Reconstruction Sustainment Brigade (SRSB). However, the common method of using a historical case study for something that is original is not possible. Therefore, this chapter uses a counterfactual (or a "what if") scenario to assist in visualizing how the theory could work.<sup>156</sup>

The scenario is: what if in February 2004 a SRSB joined with the 1<sup>st</sup> of the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry, Stryker Brigade Combat Team (1/25SBCT), to secure the Northern Iraqi Nineveh province. Then could we have prevented the insurgent seizure of the northern Iraqi city of Talafar in 2005? Due to successes made by the 101st Airborne Division in Nineveh in 2003, a force reduction occurred in 2004.<sup>157</sup> Evidence of this is the replacement of the 22,000 soldier 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne with the single 5,000 soldier SBCT.<sup>158</sup> This reduction of troops facilitated insurgents to infiltrate and gain a foothold in the city of Talafar between 2004 and 2005.<sup>159</sup> Subsequently, the 3<sup>d</sup> Armor Cavalry Regiment (3ACR) deployed from within Iraq to clear the insurgents and restore Talafar to Iraqi control.

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<sup>155</sup>US Army. *Field Manual no. 3-24*,

<sup>156</sup>A counterfactual scenario is a post-mortem (or Monday morning quarterback) exercise on what if we did this course of action (COA) instead of that one.

<sup>157</sup>Petraeus, David, H. Lieutenant General, "Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, USA Nominee to be General and Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq," 1-27. LTG Petraeus highlights this in his confirmation hearings when ask the question of what happened to Mosul after he left and why. LTG Petraeus specifically references TF Olympia size of less than a third that of the 101<sup>st</sup> ABN.

<sup>158</sup>Ibid.

<sup>159</sup>"FRONTLINE: The Insurgency," in Public Broadcasting System (PBS) [database online]. Talafar, Iraq February 21, 2006 [cited 2006]. Available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/insurgency/interviews/mcmaster.html>. This interview COL HR McMaster highlights the autonomy the insurgents reigned over Talafar before his 3rd ACR arrived in early 2005.



This counterfactual changes this story by adding a SRSB as a static force to secure Mosul in early 2004.<sup>160</sup> This addition frees the SBCT to maximize its mobility advantages in the rest of the Nineveh Area of Operations (AO).<sup>161</sup> In order for this course of action to be feasible the SRSB would need to deny the insurgents the ability of interdicting Mosul in 2004.<sup>162</sup> For this course of action to be acceptable the SRSB must accomplish the feasible criterion while continuing to conduct its “title 10” logistic functions.<sup>163</sup> Finally, for this course of action to be suitable it must maximize the inherent advantages of both the SBCT and the SRSB. By first applying relative stability power analysis the reader can gain an appreciation of this suitable evaluation criterion.

## Relative Stability Power Analysis of the Nineveh AO

The Nineveh AO in 2004 consists of over 37,125 square miles of terrain and includes the second largest city in Iraq; Mosul inhabited with approximately 1.2 million people.<sup>164</sup> The AO is divided by the Korean Army controlled Irbil Governorate. From West to East, the Nineveh AO is 230 miles of wheat-covered land between the Syrian and Iranian borders. The northern boundary is the international border of Turkey. The AO continues south on a 191-mile stretch of land that ends at the northern banks of the Euphrates River. The 2.6 million people in this area include: 1.9

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<sup>160</sup> At this point, it is important to note that this counterfactual course of action was impossible for the then Commander of TF Olympia (Multi-National Division-North), Brigadier General (BG) Carter F. Ham and the Commander 1/25 SBCT securing the Nineveh AO, COL Robert Brown. It is impossible for two major reasons. Firstly, there was no such thing as SRS Brigades, and secondly the aforementioned *COE Change # 2 and 3* from chapter one. At this period, the US Army was transforming from the traditional “army of excellence” to a “Modular” Army; the operational logistics level was still the former “army of excellence” organizations. The difference now is units like Corps Support Commands and Corps Support Groups supported strictly at the operational level of war. These units were rarely supporting the current tactical fight. Today, under modularity, these organizations can operate at the highest level of theater logistics and or the intermediate level in a regional Hub, or even down at the division tactical.

<sup>161</sup> As a brigade equipped with light armored wheeled vehicle, the Stryker, 1/25SBCT could have secured the vast area along the Syrian border while maintaining a presence and progress in the four smaller cities outside of Mosul.(These cities/towns include Talafar, Sinjar, Baji, Rubiah )

<sup>162</sup> That is to deny insurgents Mosul during the crucial national elections period just as 1/25 SBCT actually did in 2004.

<sup>163</sup> US Army Service responsibilities mandated under Title 10 of the United States Code is to supply the theater. The sustainment brigade at Mosul bears this responsibility.

<sup>164</sup> "Ninawa Governorate," in wikipedia [database online]. wikipedia April 2, 2007 [cited 2007]. Available from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ninawa\\_Governorate](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ninawa_Governorate).

million Kurds, 366,000 Arabs, 120,000 ethnic Turkomen, and 188,000 assorted groups of Assyrians, Christians, Yezidi and others. This ethnic density of Nineveh equates to 1 troop to 43 inhabitants per Appendix C (historical ratio analysis).<sup>165</sup> Including 15,000 plus Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the 18,000 soldiers of the coalition the *troop to person* ratio is 1 to 63 (still on the low side).<sup>166</sup> In 2004 the ratio was on average 1 troop to 149 persons.<sup>167</sup>

In addition to the population, *securing the environment* would require guarding the 298 miles of Iranian and Syrian *opposition* borders and screening the 219 miles of the Turkey *allied* border. These international borders include over 26 high-speed crossing sites, 20 sites shared with the major trade partners, Turkey and Syria.<sup>168</sup> To block insurgents from infiltrating into the AO across these borders require an estimated 4,000 plus border agents.<sup>169</sup> At this time there are only 700 Iraqi border patrol agents operating in this capacity.<sup>170</sup> Additionally, the Kurds in conjunction with Turkish allies are able to interdict insurgents along the Turkish border effectively freeing an additional 716 required *allied* border agents.<sup>171</sup> An additional 2600 border guards *securing the environment* in this way could have reduced the number of foreign suicide bombers that threatened Mosul on a daily basis throughout 2004.<sup>172</sup>

Beginning in 2004, the essential services of this AO underwent substantial improvements.<sup>173</sup> However, this relative stability power analysis shows the daunting build tasks (in clear-hold-

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<sup>165</sup>This includes subtracting the over 710,000 self governing Kurds of the Dehok area, and adding the 121,000 estimated disenfranchised active 10% minority against the presence of the coalition.

<sup>166</sup>The 15,000 ISF were trained by the 101<sup>st</sup> in 2003, and the 18,000 soldiers include: SBCT, the Korean Brigade (in Irbil) and SRSB

<sup>167</sup>This ratio is not just the SBCT verse the 2.6 Million Inhabitants, it accounts for the other security forces and population groups that can be considered self-securing. See Appendix D for more details.

<sup>168</sup>This number is based on Google Earth Imagery crossing sites of a major trade partner requires additional custom inspectors to clear the larger amounts of commercial traffic.

<sup>169</sup>Based on the aforementioned calculations derived from various US border sectors

<sup>170</sup>In accordance with interview with COL Arnold the Commander of 2-187 IN of the 3d Bde 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Div (OIF1) his battalion and the northern adjacent unit 3-187IN maintained an estimated 300 to 400 border guards in each of their respective AOs along the Syrian border.

<sup>171</sup>This analysis also accounts for the efforts of the 2nd Brigade 2nd Infantry Division securing the southern area of operations vicinity Kirkuk.

<sup>172</sup>Brown, Robert Colonel (Promotable), "Agile Leader Mindset Brief" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army, 2007), 1, In this brief he stated during the year of 2004 1/25 SBCT received 1,335 Improvised Explosive Device Attacks (IEDs) and 84 Suicide Vehicle Borne IEDs.

<sup>173</sup>Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq," 2-12.

build) in order to reach the benchmark status of services equivalent to that in Jordan.<sup>174</sup> The economic status of Northern Iraq is a quasi-agrarian wheat based community with various industrial / service markets. The labor statistics include an estimated 785,000 unemployed citizens, and 916,000 living below the poverty line.<sup>175</sup> To reach the Jordanian benchmark, over 390,000 persons need to gain employment and 130,000 persons need to migrate above the poverty line. In the information arena there are 36,000 persons with internet connectivity provided by 5 host servers, with an additional 3 radio broadcast stations, 2 television stations, and an estimated 46,000 operational cell phones. Based on the benchmark we need to connect 243,000 people to the internet through an additional 1,521 hosts. Likewise, Northern Iraq needs 7 more television broadcast stations and at least two more radio stations.

In terms of education, this AO has 89 children schools of various levels of disrepair, 5 College level institutions and 3 Medical and Nursing Schools.<sup>176</sup> Applying the benchmark standard, the Nineveh AO requires 1500 additional children schools, 17,000 teachers, for over 916,000 additional children between the ages of 6 and 18. The public health arena requires 6 more general hospitals, 84 clinics, with an increase of 3,325 physicians and 4,700 nurses. The transportation road network includes over 2,100 miles of various road types in overall disrepair. The effort to repave all of these roads will require 18 road construction crews working 5 days a week for 2 years.<sup>177</sup> Finally, there are over 1.2 million people living without access to improved sanitation, and water. To meet the sanitation requirements a minimum of 93 garbage trucks, three garbage transfer stations, and one 12,000 cubic yard land fill is required. Finally, this AO

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<sup>174</sup>There are two key assumptions that facilitate this analysis. The first assumption is the public services are at least in the same conditions as they were in February 2003. This provides a basis from which to start the statistic analysis of the AO. The second is that the desired endstate is to build Nineveh's capacity to the benchmark standard of Jordan.

<sup>175</sup>This computation is worse case scenario using the CIA fact book overall Iraqi percentage applied to the 2.6 million population of Nineveh AO

<sup>176</sup>The University and Medical Schools are available on line. The Elementary and secondary school data assumes Northern Iraq is the per Capita as the entire country.

<sup>177</sup>William Pettitt, "Senior Operations Manager for Engineer Refractory Company in Pa," *N/a Consultation on determining requirements for Bill of Material and Crew for Road Construction*, no. N/A (2007): 1-0. This senior manager provided crucial formulas displayed in Appendix C, and D to determine this requirement.

requires a water system to purify and distribute an additional 6.9 million gals of water per day.<sup>178</sup>

This detailed analysis took approximately 90 minutes of online open source research and can provide a coalition commander a unique understanding of the operational environment juxtapose all of the coalition's capabilities. That is relative stability power analysis. Where this section focuses on the empirical, the next section applies it conceptually in Northern Iraq. By using the method of "war-gaming" in a realistic setting, the reader will be able to observe advantages and disadvantages of using sustainment units to secure the population of Mosul.

## **Employing the Stability Reconstruction Sustainment Brigade: The Counterfactual**

As previously stated, to consider this concept feasible the SRSB must secure Mosul, just as the SBCT actually did in 2004. Consequently, what would an SRSB require in order to achieve this base standard? Moreover, what scheme of maneuver employs the SRSB to deny insurgents freedom of movement in Mosul? This concept of operations will answer these questions by showing one method of how an SRSB could operate in Mosul to achieve these objectives and more. This section starts with a more detailed understanding of SRSB assets and capabilities. Then employing the SRSB into various Combat Service and Sustainment Outposts (CSSOPs) will show it can simultaneously secure the deliverance of essential public goods while also denying the enemy freedom of movement within the city of Mosul.

The SRSB organization epitomizes the principle of war called economy of force. Today's doctrine has a sustainment brigade within Mosul conducting combat sustainment operations in Iraq. Assigning the sustainment brigade the additional responsibility of securing a city near the location it conducts normal supply distribution operation the Multi-National Division (MND)-North commander capitalizes on all the assets available in the AO. However, in order to achieve this economy of force the SRSB must have a symbiotic relationship with the adjacent "mobile"

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<sup>178</sup>This is based only on drinking water requirements of 3 gallons per person per day

units outside the city limits. While the SRSB secures the city's population the adjacent unit, specifically 1/25 SBCT, must secure the environment around Mosul.<sup>179</sup> This will mitigate the risk of a SRSB's decentralized operation, required to secure the individual delivery sites of public goods in Mosul. The second is the "on order" mobile quick reaction force mission. This mission provides the tactical quick reaction force that can promptly augment or replace the SRSB security forces in cases of emergency or insurgent overmatch. Therefore, in order for the SRSB to secure the population in Mosul, the 1/25 SBCT headquarters assigned to the western Talafar AO needs to secure the environment adjacent to Mosul.

The SRSB is a single organization conducting two separate and simultaneous missions. One mission is to maintain its United States Code "title 10" sustainment functions of resupplying the theater; and the other is securing the population of Mosul.<sup>180</sup> The design of the SRSB organization is to simultaneously accomplish these two missions using its seven subordinate battalions. This SRSB is a Sustainment Brigade (SUS BDE) made up of: two national guard light infantry battalions, one brigade troops battalion, two service and sustainment battalions, one combat support hospital, and a civil affairs task force. Additionally, this brigade has operational control of two 155mm M198 Howitzer firing batteries for indirect fire support. The organization chart in figure 3 depicts this notional brigade.

One of the two sustainment battalions in this organization maintains the "title 10" theater distribution requirements of supplying all the forces in Northern Iraq. In oversight of this support battalion is the 139 soldier support operations center that C2s this crucial supply distribution operation. This unit also maintains field maintenance and sustainment replenishment operations for the SRSB itself. In commercial terms it is the both the regional Wal-Mart distribution center for Iraq and the retail store for the units in Mosul.

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<sup>179</sup>The SBCT must ensure that no more than a 30 man terrorist team can stage and launch an attack against a CSSOP within the city limits.

<sup>180</sup>Although title 10, USC, section 401 authorizes humanitarian and civic assistance the use of title 10 here specifically applies to the congressional mandate of support required to US service members and DoD personnel.

The remaining six battalions are conducting the second mission to secure Mosul. The other service support battalion provides the foreign assistance logistics and aid to the city of Mosul.<sup>181</sup> This battalion provides direct support and over-watch of the essential services including: the ministries of transportation, education, public health, and energy / fuel distribution. Additionally, within this support battalion there are three Forward Support Companies (FSCs). These companies provide direct sustainment to the Iraqi Security forces (ISF) within Mosul.<sup>182</sup> A key mission of these FSCs is to collaborate with like Iraqi logistical units to augment the Military Transition Teams (MiTT) with tactical logistic expertise and trainers. These FSCs will simultaneously build Iraqi logistics consistent with their culture and industrial capabilities while also sustaining the ISF in the close fight.<sup>183</sup> In directly supporting the close fight with immediate world-class logistics support the coalition can maintain and build ISF combat power.<sup>184</sup>

The Brigade Troops Battalion (BTB) conducts its normal wartime mission of securing the Sustainment Brigade's main command post. Additionally, this battalion is collocated with the SRSB brigade and Nineveh Governorate Office in the center of the city to facilitate corroboration on security operations.<sup>185</sup> Augmented with a Military Intelligence Company, a Military Police Company, a Signal Communications Company, and a postal platoon the BTB is the province

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<sup>181</sup>This 321 soldier battalion can distribute daily, 1,333 stons of dry goods, 316,000 gallons of water per day (through a reverse osmosis unit), feed 25,000 persons per day, and provides 10 ambulances supporting two medical emergency rooms. This battalion can feed the governmental security forces and every member operating in the various CSSOPs throughout Mosul.


<sup>182</sup>Subordinate to the Military Transition Teams (MiTT) embedded with the three ISF Battalions, one Police Battalion, two Firefighter Stations within Mosul. In logistical doctrine this is Combat Replenishment Operations. Each 218-soldier company has the capacity to haul 633 stons of dry goods (or 300 soldiers), storing and issuing 37,000 gallons of fuel, and producing and storing 4,000 gallons of purified water.

<sup>183</sup>US Army. *Field Manual no. 3-24*, 8-3. Chapter 8 specifically talks to the dangers of mirror imaging the US Logistical structure on to the host nation. In this respect the logistical units are only providing the ability of recovering from failures in a developing logistical organization. The Iraqis are OJT'ing logistics during the most intensive combat operations imaginable these FSC help them live to learn from their mistakes

<sup>184</sup>Maintaining and Building combat power in this sense ranges from promptly treating and evacuating an Iraqi Security force member so that he can return to duty, rather than die of wounds. This also applies to the recovery of equipment and how to mitigate the loss of equipment and personnel so to only be in the short term.

<sup>185</sup>Additionally, the BTB command and controls a Military Police (MP) company, a signal company, and a Military Intelligence (MI) company. This gives the BTB the ability to conduct operations as a city security cell that directly enables the Mosul civilian authority with a secure communications network, 130 police and 235 intelligence collection and analysis personnel.

manager cell. Its mission is ensuring the deliverance of law enforcement, the running of the border patrol academy and firefighting for the city of Mosul.<sup>186</sup> Additionally, the SUS BDEs legal section is assisting in the establishment of justice and reconciliation within the Nineveh AO.<sup>187</sup>



**Figure 3 SRSB Task Organization**

The two infantry battalions conduct the “clear and hold” tasks of clear-hold-build. These infantry battalions are operating decentralized down to platoon (30 soldiers) and squad level (10 soldiers) securing each of the various CSSOPs. They split the Mosul AO between the east and west areas of the Tigris River. Additionally, each battalion has a mobile reserve company that conducts continuous reconnaissance and surveillance (R & S) patrols, snap traffic control points, and nightly raids based on actionable intelligence.<sup>188</sup> They are National Guard and not active duty because the other non-military skills these citizen-soldiers bring to the fight. Skills such as

<sup>186</sup>This border academy function is to meet the require 2600 plus border patrol agents and maintain the 4000 plus required during the entire OIF campaign.

<sup>187</sup>CSIS and Orr, *Winning the Peace*, 343. this reference outlines the requirements of establishing interim criminal justice system; training of police, corrections officers and border guard, to name a few of the mission essential tasks that this legal section will QA/QC in the province manger cell.

<sup>188</sup> have their own 80 soldier



fire fighters, police officers, city managers, and other municipal functions that will infuse the AO with continued public service expertise.

Arguably, the most important public essential service is public health and the purpose of the Combat Support Hospital (CSH). The CSH contains two 44 bed hospital modules that will become the emergency trauma support centers for many of the local general hospitals. These modular hospital units augment the trauma center of at least three hospitals in Mosul to provide emergency medical care for Iraqis and US soldiers whose life, limb, or eyesight is threatened.<sup>189</sup> This can prove to be the tipping point in defeating the insurgency by securing these choke points of community violence.<sup>190</sup> The CHS can simultaneously provide a more readily available higher level of medical treatment for both soldiers and Iraqis, while maintaining QC of the deliverance of public health in this AO.

The final battalion of the SRSB organization is the Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion Minus. This unit is similar to the aforementioned department of state sponsored PRTs but on steroids. It contains operators in the fields of engineering (civil, vertical, and horizontal), transportation, veterinary care, and multi-media broadcasting.<sup>191</sup> Finally, the PYSOP sections will C2 the information arena projects with assistance of the brigades signal company to build Mosul communications and media capacity. This includes building additional radio and television broadcast stations, and regional newspapers to meet the aforementioned Jordanian benchmark.

The Headquarters of the SRSB is collocated and partnered with the local Nineveh Civilian Leadership. This headquarters becomes the Nineveh province manager office until the Iraqis can

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<sup>189</sup>The Soldiers requiring routine care can also receive treatment at these CSH units but the Iraqi physicians will maintain the non-emergent public health portions of the hospital for the Iraqi citizens.

<sup>190</sup>Gladwell, 279.

<sup>191</sup>The battalion contains critical professional engineer experts to include a municipal level prime power team, and a vertical construction company. This construction company contains 153 soldiers whose specialties include electricians, carpentry, masonry, and general construction. In oversight of this company is a Facility Engineer Support (FES) with approximate 7 Profession Engineer (PE) Army Corps of Engineer officers who will provide initial design requirements and quality control / assurance during actual construction projects. The medium transport company in the CA Battalion provides multi-purpose 5 ton trucks that can either deliver the bill of materials for the engineer projects or transport host nation workers employed for major infrastructure projects. The 10 soldier veterinarian section includes critical cattle immunization projects and municipal food inspection.

sustain this function independently.<sup>192</sup> The critical communications linking the headquarters with every CSSOP is the Command Post of the Future (CPOF) or VOIP system. This system enables the COMPSTAT-like meeting without the physical presence of the key audience members.<sup>193</sup> This describes the organization and respective missions of the SRSB, but how will this look on the ground in Mosul?

Figure 4 provides ground level depiction of the SRSB in Mosul. The two dark shaded areas labeled FOB A and B are the large forward operating bases the 1/25 SBCT and elements of Task Force Olympia actually operated from in 2004.<sup>194</sup> In figure 4 this concept uses the CSSOP tactic and breaks up those two FOBs by distributing the former FOB residents, and division logistical assets, across the entire city into multiple combat outposts (COPs).<sup>195</sup> Of the seven battalions in this notional SRSB, only three of them are actually above zero sum gain. In fact during 2004 the CSH, one support battalion, and the equivalent of the sustainment brigade operated in FOB A.<sup>196</sup> This action can virtually eliminate the insurgent's freedom of movement by expanding our line of sight over the AO to effectively secure the population.

In addition to denying the enemy freedom of movement in Mosul these CSSOPs are operating in the continuum of essential services as described chapter 8, of the military's COIN Manual.<sup>197</sup> The SRSB will enter an operation prepared to assume the emergency deliverance of these essential services. In the course of the two-year tour the SRSB will train both institutionally and through On the Job Training (OJT) Iraqi civil workers to assume full responsibility of

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<sup>192</sup>The Movement Control Officer of the SRSB partners with the Ministry of Transportation, the BTB partners with the Chief of Police and Fires Chief, the Maintenance officer is tracking the governmental vehicle fleet, the Brigade Surgeon partners with the Ministry of Health, and so on. These military officers are embedded and working side by side with their Iraqi counterparts synchronizing the civilian military operations.


<sup>193</sup>Understanding that this is a operational security nightmare the ability to classify discussion will have to remain separate from the partnered office location.

<sup>194</sup>Brown, Robert. "Agile Leader." Also in 2004, the commander of 1/25 SBCT would frequently position a combat outpost in specific locations in downtown Mosul which severely disrupted the insurgents freedom of movement.

<sup>195</sup>Ibid. COL Brown brief: description of the effectiveness of the COP in Mosul

<sup>196</sup>This notional exercise emplaces the residents of the former FOB units into 27 various CSSOPs.

<sup>197</sup>US Army. *Field Manual no. 3-24*, 8-6. This continuum shows the deliverance of essential services moving from tactical military capacity through a transitional phase in sort of baby steps to civilian control.



**Figure 4 Concept Sketch of SRSB**

delivering the public good. Furthermore, by maintaining a presence at the deliverance site of these essential services the SRSB institutes the aforementioned means of verification while safeguarding the essential service from insurgent interdiction.

## **Evaluating the Concept**

The evaluation of this scenario and the SRSB concept will determine if it is a feasible, acceptable, and a suitable course of action to fight COIN. The commander of the 3<sup>d</sup> Armor Cavalry Regiment (ACR), COL HR McMaster will assist in this evaluation. COL McMaster led the operation to restore Talafar to Iraqi control in 2005. This chapter evaluates this SRSB option and will respond to some of the leading arguments against this concept.

## Is it Feasible?

Is it feasible that a Sustainment Brigade (SUS BDE) can secure the population of Mosul?<sup>198</sup>

When asked this question in an interview COL McMaster answered:

“It could work. It could have continued our efforts in Mosul if it was augmented with Intel, fires effects, and aviation. Specifically, a THT (Tactical HUMINT Teams) and a Brigade Aviation Element that can integrate fires and aviation functions...additionally it would need joint fires capability, but yeah, it would have done the job.”<sup>199</sup>

COL McMaster’s answer, while confirming the hypothesis of this theory, at the same time brought to light needed changes in the SRSB command and control capabilities. The empirical evidence in figure-2 (Comparison of Stability Assets between brigades) shows that an SRSB is more capable to conduct the build operations than the other brigades in the US Army.<sup>200</sup>

Nevertheless, this is not what COL McMaster was addressing when depicting the need for “THT, Fires, and BAE functions.”<sup>201</sup> He was addressing how the SUS BDE headquarters can adapt to command and control the combined arms fight to clear and hold Mosul (not just build)?<sup>202</sup>

The first augmentation is in the realm of Fires. The Fire Support Element (FSE) in an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) enables quick clearance fires on an enemy target. The FSE coordinates for assets ranging from field artillery to the Apache attack helicopters. In conjunction with the Air Forces Tactical Air Control Command Post (TACP) (also assigned in a BCT) the FSE coordinates for Close Air Support (CAS) from the Air Force. The SUS BDE does not organically contain a TACP or a FSE. These sections are crucial to planning, coordinating,

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<sup>198</sup>Note to reader: When presenting COL McMaster the course of action the SRSB was still an evolving organization. COL McMaster provided key input in the design of the SRSB as depicted in Figure 3.

<sup>199</sup> McMaster, "Interview with COL McMaster," 1-0. COL McMaster Interview after spending 20 minutes presenting the previous counterfactual,

<sup>200</sup> The functions are also the exact additional skill identifiers of the Civil Affairs soldiers.

<sup>201</sup>Ibid.

<sup>202</sup>The addition of the two Nation Guard Battalions allow the emplacement of two infantry squads at each of the 27 CSSOPs and two quick reaction companies for the aforementioned local mobile force mission. These battalions are required to conduct the hold but as stated earlier they possesses civil skills essential in rebuild Mosul. Likewise, the assignment of the MI Company gives the SRSB the crucial THT capability to collect intelligence. Finally, the operational control of two fires batteries to each infantry battalion further augments the SUS BDE to COL McMaster’s ends.

and delivering effective army artillery or air force CAS.<sup>203</sup>

The MI Company assigned to this notional SRSB provides that THT capability COL McMaster mentioned. However, the design of the SUS BDE's five-soldier intelligence section is only a conduit of already analyzed intelligence and is not sufficiently organized to supervise a MI Company.<sup>204</sup> The final aspect COL McMaster highlighted was the Brigade Aviation Element (BAE) that conducts the Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) for the IBCT. The SUS BDE would require at minimum the 6 aviation soldiers in an A2C2 section just as an IBCT. These soldiers will conduct critical aviation coordination with the supporting Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB).<sup>205</sup>

An example of a possible shortfall that proves less significant after holistic evaluation is when comparing the operations cell of an IBCT to a SUS BDE.<sup>206</sup> In stability operations of the distribution of water, fuel, public health, electrical power, construction, and other non-lethal services, the SUS BDE maintains three times the command and control capacity of its IBCT peer.<sup>207</sup> However, the soldiers themselves are not necessarily equals in this case. The sustainment brigade has a significantly higher level of experience, as it possesses much more senior ranking logisticians and engineers above the level exhibited in the other brigades.<sup>208</sup>

To summarize, in accordance with COL McMaster's guidance the SRSB needs just over 60 additional service members to integrate the combined arms of ground maneuver, aviation, and fires to meet the feasibility test. However, is this really a 60-soldier shortfall? If we were to reverse this analysis, the IBCT would require an additional 1,886 soldiers to have the same

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<sup>203</sup>This is the authorization of an IBCT, Therefore the additionally augmentation of a 27 soldier FSE section plus a 14 airmen TACSP section would be required to make a SRSB staff functional.

<sup>204</sup>The SUS BDE would require the 10 additional MI soldiers to meet the IBCT number of 15 so to manage the collection and meet the equivalent analyst requirements.

<sup>205</sup>After filling these 60 battle command functions the SUS BDE can manage the assets of the SRSB effectively.

<sup>206</sup>The S3 section of a Sustainment Brigade contains 7 soldiers to include the Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Operations Officer. The operations cell in an IBCT has over 29 soldiers also with a LTC operations officer. The math says the sustainment brigade has a 22 soldier deficit in the operations section.

<sup>207</sup>Soldier for soldier 139 to 37 skilled in deliverance of essential services

<sup>208</sup>With the aforementioned augmentation of the FES team the same seniority overmatch is true in the engineer construction functions

stability power as the SRSB.<sup>209</sup> By only adding 60 soldiers to the SRSB it simultaneously meets the requirements to clear and hold Mosul along with inherent capacity it possesses for the build task.<sup>210</sup> A combat brigade level commander assigned to this AO confirmed, “It could have worked.” However, perhaps there is a better question in terms of feasibility. Is it feasible that we continue to operate strictly within the context of Brigade Combat Teams in interventions such as COIN; when more proportions of stability power and less combat power is required?

### Is it Acceptable?

It is not acceptable that the deliverance of host country’s essential services is reliant upon US service members. It is unacceptable for an infantry squad to hand out bottles of water to a local community when there is a 3,000 gallon per hour purification unit sitting idle in a FOB.<sup>211</sup> For this option to be acceptable there must be no degradation of the support to US service members. Moreover, this course of action is only acceptable if the SRSB is operating in the aforementioned continuum of essential services.<sup>212</sup> This acceptability criterion also reviews who else can perform the build requirements of Mosul at the level of an SRSB in a non-permissive scale of intervention such as Iraq.

The daunting “build” requirements as depicted in the *relative stability power analysis of the Nineveh AO* section may seem impossible and completely unrealistic. The relative stability power analysis determines the SRSB can only fill, on average, 53% of the stability and reconstruction requirements.<sup>213</sup> The “exoskeletal structure” assists in satisfying more of the build requirements through the “pile on” of interagency, NGO and PVO assets.<sup>214</sup> However, these

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<sup>209</sup>This 1886 number was determined by using Figure 1. However, it does not include the soldiers required for internal logistics to support the IBCT itself.

<sup>210</sup>The SRSB exhibits the proportionality and balancing of all the elements of national power within a single organization respective to the scale of its respective intervention.

<sup>211</sup>Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU)

<sup>212</sup>Ibid.

<sup>213</sup>Appendix C Sheet 5 depicts the Req-Cap-Shortfall summary

<sup>214</sup>These statistics from WHO, UNICEF, UN Habitat and OECD, provide these other-than-DoD enablers analysis to visualize how their own professional engineers, doctors, nurses, teachers, and supporting bill of materials could assist in theater while enjoying the security of coalition forces at the lowest micro-level. It



build requirements are to bring the Nineveh province to the Jordanian benchmark. During the two years that the SRSB operates in Mosul, it will accomplish more essential service improvements than what has occurred in the last 15 years.<sup>215</sup>

By contrast, the SBCT sustainment units cannot operate much beyond its internal logistics requirements. The design of its Stryker Forward Support Battalion (FSB) of an SBCT is only to internally provide combat and sustainment replenishment to its 3,361 soldiers. The SRSB's however, is a group of logistical units supporting only a civilian authority.<sup>216</sup> In this respect it is more acceptable that a dedicated SRSB does stability operations, because it does not degrade sustainment to soldiers. Perhaps the most contentious issue regarding the degradation of support to service members is the application of military health support assets to civil public health.

This concept expands this purpose of the Medical Civilian Augmentation Program (MEDCAP) by collocated military trauma support systems with civil public hospitals.<sup>217</sup> Doing this can bolster an essential public service through measures of health diplomacy.<sup>218</sup> Moreover, this action of augmenting the civilian hospitals can improve the availability of medical treatment to US soldiers.<sup>219</sup> Contrary to the stories depicted on the media, the statistic known as the Died

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is "pile on" as the exoskeletal structure provides a framework for the unorganized augmentation that is usually provided by these NGO/PVO enablers.

<sup>215</sup>Immanuel Ness and James Ciment, *Encyclopedia of Global Population and Demographics*, (Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 1999)

<sup>216</sup>Additionally, the aforementioned SRSB's title 10 Support Battalion is the exact same level organization providing theater distribution operations today. Thus, there is no degradation in the Mission Staging and Sustainment Replenish Operations that it would normally as only a SUS BDE TO.

<sup>217</sup>US Army, *FM 1.02*, 323. MEDCAP is the concept of military health workers supporting a civilian population. MEDCAP missions are usually short term operations focused on specific programs such as immunizations, and preventive medicine projects.

<sup>218</sup>Vanderwagen, "Health Diplomacy: Winning Hearts and Minds through the use of Health Interventions," 3-4.

<sup>219</sup>Holcomb, John, B. Colonel, "Brief from United States Army Institute of Surgical Research, Medical Research and Materiel Command," Brief on Trauma Systems and Support during OIF and OEF (2006): 1-0. Brief from COL Holcomb Today in Iraq there are Forward Surgical Teams (FST) with casualty censuses as low as one liter urgent casualty per year. Those FSTs could have been in Mosul's at the al Zarihwi Hospital providing treatment to the daily surge of ISFs casualties evacuated to this ER. COL Holcomb who is the chief of trauma system management for the US Army highlighted this census.



of Wounds (DOW) rate in Iraq and in Afghanistan exceeds that of Vietnam and World War II.<sup>220</sup>

The difference is due to the longer distance required to evacuate a casualty to the nearest medical treatment facility. Of the hundreds of soldiers that died during medical evacuation over 17% could have survived if more advanced intermediate medical treatment was available during evacuation.<sup>221</sup> This idea of co-locating US medical capabilities at public hospitals all over Iraq can provide more readily available treatment facilities to evacuate our soldiers.<sup>222</sup> But how many CSHs and SRSB are required to secure the populations of a country the size of Iraq?

The requirements of moderately big interventions such as Iraq are at least 9 Sustainment Brigades and 2 Combat Support Brigades (Maneuver Enhancement) (CSB (ME)) with 14 Support Battalions and 3 CSHs. Within the US Military, there are 28 brigade level sustainment units (25 US Army SUS BDEs and 3 Marine Logistical Regiments). In addition to these brigades, the US Military has over 15 Combat Support Hospitals and 190 Support Battalions (with more than 90 non-forward or brigade support battalions). Additionally the US Army has 6 Combat Support Battalions (Maneuver Enhancement) that have varying vertical and horizontal engineer capabilities. Therefore over a quarter of the Military's Logistical and Engineer Assets are required for a single rotation. However, this rotational requirement is only a 30% increase in overall sustainment and support assets currently operating currently in Iraq today.<sup>223</sup>

Given these numbers, is it acceptable to have a sustainment brigade take on this foreign

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<sup>220</sup>Ibid. COL Holcomb highlighted that the DOW rate of WWI was 3.5%, Vietnam 3.0%, Afghanistan as of 2005 was 6.8% and Iraq in 2005 was 3.9%. Of the combined number of soldiers who have died of wounds, almost 18% were survivable if they reached a medical treatment facility in time.

<sup>221</sup>In that respect a US convoy conducting R & S patrol has an IED strike in the vicinity of one of these US physician' augmented civilian hospitals. Rather than Medically Evacuating (MEDEVAC) this casualty to the nearest FOB for Advanced Trauma Lifesaving treatment. This wounded soldier could be driven block down the street to the nearest hospital. Today, wounded soldiers are MEDEVAC'd to the further away FOBs where the respective US medical treatment team only operates. In this respect we are improving medical treatment for the ISF and to our soldiers by operating in the method suggested in chapter three.

<sup>222</sup> Donna Abu-Nasr, "Burned Iraqi Children Turned Away by US Army Doctors," *Associated Press*, June 23, 2003 2003, sec. Freelance, p. 1. Additionally by organizing trauma systems this way we can forego the tragic June 2003 associated press article. The article covered the incident involving US doctors at a FOB in Iraq refusing to treat an injured Iraqi child. Not only was the father of the child devastated but the soldier, Sgt. 1st Class Brian Pacholski, who originally called for medical assistance for this child was equally distraught by the doctor's refusal.

<sup>223</sup>This is an estimate extracted from doctrinal emplacement of logistical assets in a theater such as Iraq

assistance role? Certainly, it is more acceptable to have a SUS BDE conducting civil service operations than the BCTs currently performing in this capacity. Additionally, as highlighted in this section these units operating in this capacity enhance the support provided to our service members. Moreover, what would be the long term effect on the capability of SUS BDEs and CSB(ME)s operating in this expanded role? One effect is a logistical corps as skilled and experienced in synchronizing all the battlefield functions as their maneuver peers with the increased ability of self-security and survivability. Furthermore, a SUS BDE operating in this capacity is more suited than its combat arms BCT peers for civil enabling operations.

### Is it Suitable?

Evaluating the suitability of this option will determine whether a SRSB organization can meet the commander's intent in conducting counterinsurgency operations. The suitability test also reviews the economy of force advantages of using a SUS BDE as the decisive effort in Mosul. Finally, this criterion will address the common argument that only maneuver commands are suitable headquarters to synchronize battlefield functions required for counterinsurgent warfare.<sup>224</sup> This concept maximizes the inherent advantages of all units towards missions more suitable to their respective competencies.<sup>225</sup> Furthermore, if a BCT has little capacity to empower a civilian authority beyond the realm of security then how can it holistically support a host government?<sup>226</sup>

A static sustainment unit securing the stationary deliverance sites of civil public goods is advantageous. It is even more advantageous when the SUS BDE must already operate in proximity of these locations performing its title 10 responsibilities. Similarly, a highly mobile Stryker unit patrolling and securing a vast area of operations is also more advantageous. This is

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<sup>224</sup>U.S. Army, *FM 3-0 (DRAG)*,. The previous version of this draft described that a Maneuver commanders ability to synchronize major combat operations make him more effective in synchronizing lower scale operations such as counterinsurgency.

<sup>225</sup>A Stryker Brigade maximizing its mobility advantages to secure a huge area of operations along the Syrian Border supersedes its medium armor advantages and stability limitations in an urban environment

<sup>226</sup>Refer to figure 2 to visualize this difference

economy and efficiency of force. The application stability power uses all our assets directly to defeat an insurgency while matching the inherent capabilities of each unit with missions resembling their core competencies.<sup>227</sup> However, the stability operations in Mosul are not devoid of some serious combat.<sup>228</sup> In the year 1/25 SBCT secured Mosul it experienced over 3,056 enemy attacks.<sup>229</sup> In such intensive combat environments, are maneuver commands the only headquarters capable of integrating battlefield functions?

This argument that only maneuver commanders can effectively synchronize all the battlefield functions has answers in the realm of the physical and in the mental. In the realm of the physical, COL McMaster answers this in the “is it feasible?” section. The 60-service member augmentation in the SUS BDE staff fills this shortfall completely. However, in the realm of the mental there is the element of organizational culture that needs addressing.

Since the dawn of warfare, there is the common view that logistics is the lesser form of soldiering.<sup>230</sup> Logisticians exist to support the combat arms. Evidence of this perception is how a logistician will never command a Brigade Combat Team, a Division, or a Corps in the US Army.<sup>231</sup> Additionally, *COE Change # 2*, is only now reaching the new generations of logistical soldiers and leaders. There are whole generations of logisticians brought up in an army with a defined rear area as their station in life. Today’s non-linear / non-contiguous battlefield skews these traditional positions of front and rear areas. However, if the logistician’s organizational culture is to assume supporting roles perhaps this makes them better suited to command COIN and stability operations decisive in winning it.

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<sup>227</sup>Sustainment soldiers conducting civil sustainment functions are more advantageous than soldiers trained only in closing with and destroy an enemy conducting said civil sustainment functions.

<sup>228</sup>Thus it is not just an SUS BDE securing Mosul but the aforementioned SRSB with all the battlefield functions

<sup>229</sup>Brown, Robert. “Agile Leader.” 3,056 Enemy Attacks: 1,335 Improvised Explosive Device Attacks; (IEDs); 84 Suicide Vehicle Borne IEDs; 439 IEDs found and reduced by EOD (33% - Most in Iraq); 1,513 Direct Fire Attacks & 631 Indirect Fire Attacks.

<sup>230</sup> Martin L. Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 313. As ascertain in “Supplying War” by lack of historical analysis.

<sup>231</sup>Such positions are coded 03 on TOEs as not available for combat support officers

The leading historical counterinsurgency principle is “legitimacy is the main objective.”<sup>232</sup> This verifies that supporting the host nation government is paramount in achieving legitimacy in the eyes of its people. In the aforementioned interview with RADM Vanderwagen he stated: “organizationally, cultures that maintain a willingness to support a customer tends to be what is required rather than an organization that assumes all authority.”<sup>233</sup> Logisticians are certainly more familiar with working with civilians than their combat arms peers. Junior logistical and support officers begin to interface with civilian contractors and enablers within the first year of service.<sup>234</sup> However, what are the long term effects of a King like commander versus a commander that enables a legitimate civilian authority?

All too often commanders in Iraq are the kings of their area of operation.<sup>235</sup> A culture that encourages bold domineering personalities is important in the initial stages of stabilizing a crisis and essential in MCO. However, the long-term effect of dividing a country in to area of operations ruled by maneuver commanders is the de-legitimization of the host country’s civil authority. In this regard, service support commanders are more suitable and familiar with enabling success of another. Logisticians know exactly what RADM Vanderwagen is referring to in the comment “willingness to support a customer.” More importantly, the maneuver commander skilled only in the synchronization of kinetic forces does not embody the proportion respective to the scale of intervention. In COIN environments, a commander’s experience that can balance combat and stability power is more advantageous.

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<sup>232</sup>US Army. *Field Manual no. 3-24*, 1-12.

<sup>233</sup>Vanderwagen, "Interview with Rear Admiral Craig Vanderwagen; the US Assistant Deputy Secretary of Crisis and Response."

<sup>234</sup>BCT commanders in the course of their careers have very little institutional interaction with civilian enablers. Conversely, logisticians throughout their careers learn how to access the commercial / industrial complex through institutionalized organizations such as Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and Army Materiel Command (AMC).

<sup>235</sup>Dexter Filkins, "The Fall of the Warrior King," *New York Times Magazine* 155, no. 5337 (10/23 2005): 52-59. This article in the New York Times highlights an extreme example of such a commander. Common title of Mayor Talafar, or Proconsul of Iraq are descriptions of US Commanders in Iraq.

## **CONCLUSION: Way Ahead**

Early this summer, as with past summers, at colleges and universities, at West Point and at Fort Benning, newly commissioned officers will be disappointed in the branch insignia pinned on the collar of their new army dress uniform. They have spent the last several years as a cadet yearning for a branch insignia akin to crossed rifles, crossed cannons, or crossed sabers. On this day of their commissioning into the US Army, these saddened young officers wear a branch resembling the steering wheel of a pirate ship, some winged cannon ball, or maybe even a medieval castle. The tragedy of this disappointment is that these officers could be more decisive in winning the war on terrorism than their peers wearing the branches resembling a 19<sup>th</sup> Century weapon. These lieutenants are future combat support commanders of a stability and reconstruction force able to project stability power into the most hostile environments. They are the point of penetration that allows the beacon of light our forefathers talked about to shine on a people that have only perceived America as the source of evil in the world. This idea of making sustainment and support units decisive speaks to these lieutenants. How can the army meet the expectations of these young combat support officers? The first step is to convince these second lieutenants that they can make a difference.

### **In the Next Year:**

We can tell them that military doctrine says they are decisive. Logistical doctrine writers must immediately embrace FM 3-24, Chapter 8. The implications of this document are not resonating in any emerging logistical concepts. Both the *Modular Logistical Concept* document and the overview on logistical transformation brief should engage logisticians on how to develop our capacity to meet the intent of the COIN Manual. More importantly, we logisticians must engage in the discourse on how we can become decisive in COIN. This includes logisticians in the entire US military.

The argument put forward here barely addresses the joint logistic assets. Further development of the stability power concept integrating the Air Force, USMC, and Naval

capabilities is required. An additional shortfall of this argument is the focus on the high end of the scales of interventions, Iraq. In doing so, it neglected to discuss the even more robust capability the SRSB could provide in conditions exhibited in Afghanistan, the horn of Africa, and its applications in response to domestic crisis. An SRSB force would be more suitable in domestic crisis and natural disaster than a brigade of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne and certainly more palatable for the guardians of Posse Comitatus.<sup>236</sup> However, these are all steps in the realm of the cognitive. What are the ground level possibilities of this concept today?

The major significance of instituting Sustainment Brigades in the short term in this new role could change the rotational management of OIF and OEF. By expanding the pool of available units from only Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) to all brigades capable of fighting COIN operations, we can facilitate the army's ability to maximize the inherent advantages of all its forces. However, applying cautionary smaller steps is critical as it is still just theory. Therefore, implementing sub-elements of employing stability power in Iraq is more advantageous than a model that can immediately stabilize the force.

One immediate mission in Iraq that requires the employment of stability power is the concept of logistical support to Iraqi Security Forces. There is an immediate need to organize Forward Support Companies (FSC) (plus medical platoons) to ISF Battalion MiTT Teams. As described earlier, these FSCs will prove crucial in maintaining and building Iraqi combat power. Additionally, these companies can provide the ISF mobility and operational reach to confront the ever changing locations and requirements of COIN. In addition to enhancing the ISF logistics, immediately breaking up the FOBs and incorporating CSHs, water teams, engineers, military

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<sup>236</sup>"Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385)," in U.S. Government Printing Office [database online]. 732 N. Capitol Street, NW • Washington, DC 20401 April 4, 2007 [cited 2007]. Available from <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/index.html>. "A Reconstruction Era criminal law proscribing use of Army (later, Air Force) to "execute the laws" except where expressly authorized by Constitution or Congress. Limit on use of military for civilian law enforcement also applies to Navy by regulation. Dec '81 additional laws were enacted (codified 10 USC 371-78) clarifying permissible military assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies--including the Coast Guard--especially in combating drug smuggling into the United States. Posse Comitatus clarifications emphasize supportive and technical assistance (e.g., use of facilities, vessels, aircraft, intelligence, tech aid, surveillance, etc.) while generally prohibiting direct participation of DoD personnel in law enforcement (e.g., search, seizure, and arrests)."

police, and more into Micro-FOBs (under the current control of BCT in the respective AOs) is the most realistic application for the upcoming build operations in Iraq.

After establishing the exoskeleton structure of these essential service outposts immediately fill it in with “muscle.” Muscle defined as USAID contracted specialists and NGOs as applicable. This brings the public service of these outposts closer to the benchmark standard. This will also facilitate the perception of legitimacy for the Iraqi government. Furthermore, the immediate establishment of higher-level education institutions will provide replacement of this foreign muscle with Iraqi muscle.<sup>237</sup>

Finally, in the short term we stop dividing the DIME lines. Every agency can exhibit all the elements of national power. Depending on the scale of intervention certain agencies may have more of a role than others. The scale of the intervention should determine the appropriate lead agency and not the linear application of DIME.<sup>238</sup> Moreover, every peace-waging operation should have all available US government assets to achieve success. Therefore, the *civilian response corps* should not attempt to relieve the burden of state building from the military but augment the military in non-permissive scales of intervention. Vis-à-vis’ the military should augment the *civilian response corps* and Department of State in more permissive scales of interventions.

### **In the Next three years**

DOTMLPF is an acronym for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities. Organize an SRSB and put them through the “DOTMLPF” ringer. This describes the categories the military uses in developing a new organization/concept. This

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<sup>237</sup>Through the simultaneous expansion of the Iraqi medical schools and other universities while instituting scholarship exchange programs that bring Iraqi students to the US we can help build this Iraqi muscle. A measure of effectiveness to these immediate operations will be the mass return of the 2 million expatriate Iraqis. Reintegration of these predominately middle class citizens is will be required.

<sup>238</sup> Bush, "National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-44: Management of Interagency Efforts in Reconstruction and Stabilization," 1. This directive assigns the Department of State the led on “nation-building” for the US Government. No single agency should be assigned the led of something that requires synchronizing all the elements of national power.



document discusses most of these categories minus the training category. Such a SUS BDE becoming a SRSB and securing an AO such as Mosul would need no less than what a Stryker BCT received as a new organization going through the ARFORGEN training cycle. This includes an initial local training, Battlefield Command Training Programs (BCTP) and a Mission Readiness Exercise MRX.

In this 18-month intensive process, a single SRSB can be ready to assume a single AO. As this is theory, and never been tested beyond the chapter four wargame, deploying a single SRSB to a region like Mosul or Basra (relieving the British) or to Afghanistan allows for smaller more cautionary steps rather than implementing this immediately across an entire theater.<sup>239</sup> This will allow for a smaller operational reserve required to “back-up” the new single SRSB. Moreover, this facilitates immediate realization of its economy of force advantages in concurrent operations.

## **In the Next Decade and Beyond**

As this concept grows and satisfies more requirements, it could become a standing and separate stability and reconstruction sustainment corps. Much as the US Army Air Corps became the US Air Force, this Stability and Reconstruction Forces (SRF) becomes a separate service. The separate service chief of an SRF will advance the level of expert military advice to our civil leadership on operations in the future. Furthermore, by making this a separate SRF branch it can continue to expand the capability of the uniformed services in these higher scale interventions while becoming more useful in the lesser more permissive scales.<sup>240</sup>

Ending the evaluation of this concept on whether stability power is suitable with the discussion on organizational culture is perhaps most fitting. This is because organizational culture is possibly the final barrier preventing sustainment units from assuming this role. Usually the lack of doctrine is the final hurdle to the implementation of new ideas in the military. In this

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<sup>239</sup>Much in the same way, we sent the Stryker Brigade to its first combat operation to Mosul.

<sup>240</sup>For example, in response to catastrophic homeland natural disaster this SRF corps can be subordinate to FEMA or Homeland Security without the trappings of Posse Comitatus. Moreover routine title 10 support operations to US forces as a joint ground logistical asset still can support the more traditional MSO.

case, doctrine written in the military's COIN Manual is visionary, and enables this *theory of stability power*.<sup>241</sup> Another supposed barrier is the apprehension of overstressing our logistical sustainment units resulting in failure to support our service members. This is certainly reason for great pause and caution. However, this argument is what is called a "gumption trap."<sup>242</sup> Sustainment units operating in this capacity can exhibit the ultimate mission support by taking over what are predominately logistical and engineer functions from the maneuver units currently operating in this capacity.<sup>243</sup> Certainly, lack of force protection capability is not a contemporary issue as sustainment and support platoons are successfully operating autonomously throughout Iraq on every major supply route.<sup>244</sup> Therefore, what else other than our military cultural is stopping the military from even trying such an economy of force course of action as described in chapter three?

In all, this vision of a force balanced with representation of combat and stability power may prove the only acceptable alternative to meet the immediate emergency and security requirements of a failing state. The statistics of stability operations demand use of logistical and engineer expertise and materiel. This conceptualization and analysis presents something new; employing logistical units as the decisive operation in COIN.<sup>245</sup> This is the Stability and Reconstruction Sustainment Brigade, the organization that possesses the most relative stability power required in Iraq today and back in April of 2003.

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<sup>241</sup>To date only in this specific doctrine and this monograph is the dialogue on the usage of sustainment units as decisive in counterinsurgency occurring.

<sup>242</sup>Robert M. Pirsig, *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance : An Inquiry into Values*, Quilld ed. (New York: W. Morrow, 1999), 436. 322. Robert Pirsig in this philosophical work describes a various reason on why we fail to take initiative and apply resourcefulness as Gumption Traps. He would categorize this argument against using sustainment assets as version of an *Anxiety-Gumption Trap*, "You're so sure you'll do everything wrong you're afraid to do anything at all."

<sup>243</sup>Moreover, as the clear and hold is complete in Baghdad in 2007 and we look over our shoulders for PRTs (or the 250 civil servants of the civilian response corps) to assume this build mission we will have a decision to make. The decision to assign these logistical and engineering tasks to the available Brigade Combat Team or the realization that in scales of intervention like Iraq there is no other organization in the entire US Government that can ensure distribution of essential services and the proper conduct of the build task as our sustainment and support units.

<sup>244</sup>As per COE Change # 2

<sup>245</sup>It demonstrates one method of balancing the requirements of combat actions with the requirements of stability operations in a single organization.

## APPENDIX A Opportunity Cost Analysis of Not Doing State-Building

One of the main arguments opposing state building is that of fiscal cost. It is typically a question phrased: *why should we pay for such expenditures as foreign aid when we need improvements in our own domestic capacity?* Opportunity cost analysis of the 9/11 terrorist attacks may provide the answer to this question in the cold monetary realm.<sup>246</sup> The 9/11 commission final report states that prevention abroad was a critical point of failure resulting in the terrorist attacks.<sup>247</sup> The cost of not preventing the partnership of al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in the 1990s is in excess of \$1.5 trillion (or the costs of the 9/11 terrorist attacks).<sup>248</sup> The cost of funding the military, reconstruction, and developmental aid to Afghanistan in the mid 1990s would have cost no more than \$100 Billion it has cost since 2001.<sup>249</sup> Therefore, if we invested in the \$100 billion in state-building operations in Afghanistan in the mid 1990s and prevented the 9/11 terrorist attacks we could have saved \$1.4 trillion.<sup>250</sup> The issue here is not just hindsight but that we never know what we prevent in pursuing state building. Therefore, how do we justify its expense? The terrorist attacks of 9/11 allow us to communicate unforeseen

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<sup>246</sup>([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunity\\_cost](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunity_cost)) In economics, opportunity cost, is *the cost of something in terms of an opportunity forgone* (and the benefits that could be received from that opportunity), i.e. the second best alternative.

<sup>247</sup>National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report : Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, Authoriz , 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 2004), 604. Of the 41 recommendations listed in the 9/11 commission's final report number seven talks to this lesson. It states: "Just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously. America does stand up for its values. The United States defended, and still defends, Muslims against tyrants and criminals in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us."

<sup>248</sup>Gail Makinen, *the Economic Effects of 9/11: A Retrospective Assessment* (Report to Congress: Specialist in Economic Policy, 2002), 2. This total estimate does not consider the emotional damage of the 9/11 attacks or cost of the subsequent deaths of the service members involved in the GWOT, which are both truly impossible to quantify. Additionally, this does not include the estimated trillion dollars hit our market economy suffered from those attacks. Malikens report to congress discusses this market effects in detail The fiscal cost of 9/11 is estimated in physical damages of \$20 billion, an additional \$393 million for subsequent health cost, and \$95 Billion to implement all of the 9/11 Commission measures. Additionally, since, 9/11 we have spent a total of \$502 billion dollars fighting the Global War on Terrorism. All these cost total \$1.5 Trillion.

<sup>249</sup>Ibid

<sup>250</sup>The cost of \$100 Billion is not time value money. State Building in Afghanistan in the Mid 1990s would cost less than it has on this decade after adjusting for inflation. This simplistic calculation is of course post-mortem, and assumes that state-building operations could have thwarted Al Qaeda.


catastrophes we disrupt through such interventions.

Cost of Not Preventing the State Failure of Afghanistan	
<b>Estimated Costs Since 9/11 Terror Attacks</b>	
Physical Damages	\$20,000,000,000.00
Health Related Costs	\$393,000,000.00
9/11 Preventive Measures	\$1,000,000,000,000.00
GWOT Expenses	\$502,000,000,000.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1,522,393,000,000.00</b>
<b>Cost 6 years of Nation Building In Afghanistan</b>	
Esitmated Cost of Nation-building	\$100,000,000,000.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$100,000,000,000.00</b>
<b>Opportunity cost of not intervening in Afghanistan</b>	
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1,422,393,000,000.00</b>

**Figure A-1 Opportunity Cost of not State-Building Afghanistan**

## APPENDIX B Example of Combat Power Analysis

An example of relative combat power analysis is in figure B-1 where an Apache (Attack Helicopter) Battalion (in blue font) is attacking two opposing mechanized infantry battalions (in red font). The US Apache Battalion with a force ratio of 5.00 is conducting a hasty (unplanned) attack against two enemy mechanized infantry battalions in a deliberate (planned) defense with a combined force ratio of 1.30. The results of this hypothetical engagement validate a proper force ratio of 3.85 to 1, with an estimated 25% friendly loss and 40% enemy. This is an example of how relative combat power does not possess the capability to assess securing the operational environment in COIN or stability operations decisive in winning it.



**Figure B-1 Relative Combat Power Analysis**

## APPENDIX C Historical Techniques to Determine How Many Troops in COIN Operations

This appendix lays out the *Troop to Civilian*; and Anthony Joes' *Troop to Insurgent* ratios for eleven separate COIN (related) operations. The use of *troop to population* ratio is relatively new. In determining how many troops, this ratio is a step above previous techniques. However, one disadvantage is it treats all populations equal. It does not account for the societal and cultural demographics of a respective population. Another method of determining troop strength in COIN operations is the *counterinsurgent to insurgent* ratio. This ratio, depicted by Anthony Joes in his book *Resisting Rebellion*, analyzes the amount of resources committed historically by COIN forces, to include: the British in Malaya (1948-60), and the Soviets in Afghanistan (1980s).<sup>251</sup> However, this ratio is only truly applicable in post-mortem analysis. The greatest advantage insurgents possess is anonymity; specifically among an ambivalent population. Not knowing the exact size of an insurgent faction makes using the counterinsurgent to insurgent ratio nebulous at best. Still, by using this data we can take Joes' analysis even further.

In addition to these civilian and insurgent based ratios, this appendix depicts the ratios of *Troop to Terrain* (per square mile); and *Troop to Ethnic Density*. The square mile ratio was relatively effortless to apply after the hard research Joes already completed. The *troop to ethnic density* ratio is much more intricate and provides a more contextual understanding of troop requirements. When assessing the requirements of a stability force, understanding the political and social environment is required. Rather than understanding, all the detailed idiosyncrasies of the host nation's culture we focus troop requirements by focusing on the nation's *intensity of preference*.

Intensity of preference is defined as the "the deliberation, and ranking of issues according to

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<sup>251</sup>Joes, 251. Joes also discusses the ancient Roman method of determining how many roads are built as a symbol of adequate troop requirements.

severity of need or intensity, or those factors which are central in deliberative democracy.”<sup>252</sup>

When looking at intensity of preference from a macro perspective we do not need to know all the various micro issues. Only understanding the possible schisms of the host nation in terms of their respective population shares and susceptibility to external influences is essential.

In determining whether a commercial market is competitively distributed or monopolistically concentrated the U.S. Department of Justice, uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).<sup>253</sup> HHI measures market concentration for purposes of antitrust enforcement.<sup>254</sup> Using HHI to demonstrate the concentration of social, cultural, political, ethnic, and distribution of power within a government is not necessary what Mr. Herfindahl and Hirschman initially intended. However, by using the HHI to show the level of concentration of a respective demographic we can quantifiably show more or less favorable conditions for an occupying stability force. Specifically, we can use this index to quantifiably speculate on sectarian strife or perhaps monopoly of power.<sup>255</sup>

The method of determining HHI is by square rooting the percentage of each respective market/demographic share and then summing up the total. When using the HHI to analyze ethnicity or religion there is a need for more intermediate margins than what the Justice Department uses. Figure C-1 depicts using the HHI method to analyze the various sectarian divisions in Iraq. By squaring the percent distribution of the respective demographic and adding those up the HHI is determined. The US Justice Department states that a market with a HHI of 1000 or below is a competitive market; between the margins of 1000 to 1800 the market is suspect of monopolistic practices; and above 1800 is considered highly concentrated. When

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<sup>252</sup>Richard Ellis, *Democratic Delusions : The Initiative Process in America*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 260. <sup>252</sup>


<sup>253</sup><http://www.unclaw.com/chin/teaching/antitrust/herfindahl.htm>

<sup>254</sup>Ibid

<sup>255</sup>By identifying historical grievances and ethnicity of the population we can determine if there will be relatively higher potential for sectarian conflict. For example, in Iraq in 2003 the totalitarian regime of Saddam Hussein suppressed all other political, social, and ethnic intensities of preference factors. When removing the regime the historical grievances between these sects came to the surface. However, what is particularly interesting is the relative market share of these different sects.



analyzing ethnic density the intermediate ground between 2500 and 6000 is historically a more contentious range.



**Figure C-1 Example of Using HHI to Analyze Religious Demographics**

For example, Iraq is not homogenous and not distributed either. Iraq has a large Sunni minority population (35%) a relative small majority of Shia (65%) and 3% other affiliations, with an HHI of 5280. Countries in this middle ground margin tend to require more troops to diffuse internal strife. The Japanese society in 1946 is 99% Shinto or extremely homogenous / monopolistic with an HHI equaling 9802.<sup>256</sup> Within the confines of religion and ethnic sects there is little chance of internal sectarian violence in post WWII Japan (minus a Shinto reformation).<sup>257</sup> An example of a distributed, very un-concentrated population is the one the British faced in the 1898 Boer War in South Africa. At this time, the South Africa ethnic distribution was separated between 9 major sects with an average demographic share of 11% each and a HHI of 1410. . Figure C-2 depicts the various ratios and HHIs for 11 post conflict operations. Iraq is an example of the middle ground in terms of HHI.

By contrast, a homogenous society with an HHI between 8000 and 10000 tend to require smaller *Troop to Civilian* ratios. This is because with homogenous societies in post conflict operations there is common ground on intensity of preference and shared context of the subsequent occupation. The common ground is the understanding that they all have just been defeated. An example is the 1945 occupation of Japan with the *Troop to Civilian* ratio of one soldier to 204 Japanese. Highly distributed societies made up of several small minorities are not as “easy” but are better than the middle ground. Heterogeneous societies with disenfranchised

<sup>256</sup>  $\text{HHI of } 9802 = (99\% \times 100)^2 + (1\% \text{ others} \times 100)^2$

<sup>257</sup> John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat : Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999), 676. Additionally, by maintain the Hirohito General Douglas MacArthur harnessed this national homogenous population.

factions facilitate the post conflict, occupational blame game. An example is the previously discussed Spanish guerillas (the Naverrees) not submitting after the surrender of the Spanish Bourbon's to French in 1808.

	Troop to Person	HHI	Troop to Insurgent	Troop to Sq Mile
OIF	1 to 57	6,050	0.1 to 1	2.8 to 1
Boer	1 to 12	1,410	5.6 to 1	1.1 to 1
Soviet (Afghanistan)	1 to 175	2,700	0.6 to 1	0.5 to 1
Malaya	1 to 15	3,967	29.3 to 1	7.0 to 1
French Spain (1800s)	1 to 33	5,818	3.2 to 1	1.5 to 1
Vietnam (French)(1950s)	1 to 83	7,461	1.5 to 1	3.5 to 1
Vietnam (USA)	1 to 460	7,461	0.3 to 1	0.6 to 1
Japan Post WWII (USA)	1 to 286	9,802	N/A	1.7 to 1
Chinese (Tibet)	1 to 30	9,801	2.5 to 1	0.6 to 1
Algeria	1 to 22	9,802	11.3 to 1	0.5 to 1
Germany Post WWII (USA Zone)	1 to 450	9,802	N/A	0.9 to 1

\*Red Denotes Fails COIN / Occupation

**Figure C-2 Historical Troop Ratios in Post Conflict Scenarios**

Why is it that these large minorities and small majorities increase sectarian strife post conflict? In the case in Iraq, Salafist Sunnis never shared the view that the Saddam regime empowered the Sunnis in Iraq.<sup>258</sup> The Shia majority after decades of Baathist oppression viewed the fall of Iraq in 2003 not as a national defeat but an opportunity to seize power. Likewise, the Kurds clearly view the coalition invasion as liberation, and a chance for power sharing as opposed to the previous Baathist oppression. Clearly, this appendix and Iraq displays that no civilian population is equal. Each nation-state's demographic density is different and likewise demands dissimilar troop requirements.

In rank ordering religion, culture, social class in what is important within the context of the host country we grasp what will follow the removal of a despotic totalitarian regime. Adapting

<sup>258</sup>Osama bin Laden, "Bin Laden Tape: Text," British Broadcasting Corporation (2003). In this broadcast Osama bin Laden refers to apostate regimes of which he included the Saddam regime. This point is also highlighted in Bernard Lewis the Crisis of Islam. As Osama offered to conduct an Afghanistan like insurgency against Saddam in 1990 upon the invasion of Kuwait.

the HHI method to analyze sectarian divides juxtapose the *intensity of preference* facilitates the quantifiable determination of the soldier requirement to *secure the population*.<sup>259</sup> The summary of these various ratios is that they only center on “how many” troops are required and not “what” is required in building capacity in the host country. This is where the theory of stability power can provide some analytical answers.

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<sup>259</sup>with much more efficiency than a 1 to 50 ratio

## **APPENDIX D Relative Stability Power Analysis**

As discussed in chapter two, relative stability power analysis is the method to determine what is more or less powerful in conducting stability operations. To determine stability power a new model is required that can augment the military's previous relative combat power analysis model known as Correlation of Force and Means (CoFMs). On the other hand, as FM 5-0 suggests, determining the requirements of stability operations versus capabilities is the only realistic method of determining troop strength in such operations. FM 5-0 does not account for stability operations during the dynamic presence of an insurgency. Therefore, a model that simultaneously quantifies the requirements of conducting stability operations to defeat an insurgency while conducting combat action operations to destroy insurgents is required. Relative stability power does exactly that through satisfying essential elements of operational information. The first element is the effects of the mission and how it limits or expands the requirements of counterinsurgency and its decisive stability operations.

The assessment of mission requirements determines the effect the national strategic objective and end state will have on the operation. These objectives set quantifiable parameters for the entire operation and limit or expand our stability operations requirements. The factors of mission requirements include: the mission statement; the scale of intervention; the desired disposition of the government and its security forces; and the regional objectives. One example is deciding whether to demobilize and demilitarize the host country's army has significant logistical implications.

Selecting the demilitarize button on this computer program simultaneously changes the number of soldiers in the host country available post conflict security while increasing the logistics requirements of a operation. Demilitarization requires demobilization camps, transportation assets, and sustainment for this former army until reintegration into the society is complete. Additionally, these troops are not available for the post-conflict security mission that will have to be filled by some other means. This is just one factor of mission requirements that significantly affects the nature of stability/COIN operations. Carl Von Clausewitz wrote in a letter advising a friend on the

tactical feasibility of a notional exercise: “*we cannot ignore those conditions that have brought about war and that determine its political purpose.*” As uncertain as war is Clausewitz sees planning for war’s sake futile without accounting for political objectives. Yet, previous models of combat power analysis forgo this mission requirement assessment as they are only considering the single engagement relative only to the enemy. When assessing Stability Power Analysis the word “relative” takes on an expanded meaning.

We cannot use the word relative (in relative stability power analysis or relative combat power analysis) if we do not include an analysis of the strategic objectives and their respective effects on the ways and means of the operation. For example, selecting whether we are defeating a nation or a state, significantly changes the troop requirement.<sup>260</sup> Defeating an entire nation defeats its state and its people, as exhibited in WWII with Japan or in Germany. This significantly reduces the possibility of post conflict schisms and sectarian strife.<sup>261</sup> In defeating only the Saddam Regime (state) in Iraq, we incur higher probability of the post-conflict power grab as mentioned in the previous appendix. This tool begins adding and subtracting assets based on the mission requirements. Understanding what we are going to do in such interventions can set the stage for assessing the other essential elements of stability power. Thus, it will allow advisors of military affairs to determine our own troop requirements to mitigate the dissolving of an ultra-nationalist party, or demilitarizing states armed forces.

After assessing mission requirements, we can then assess the initial operational environment (IOE).<sup>262</sup> It is “initial,” because it has not yet been physically altered by the intervention. It displays the country as it is before the intervention. The foundations from which the coalition will help build a state. The Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) doctrine refers to a system


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<sup>260</sup> Defeating a nation or a state is not necessarily and objective as it is a description of reality. We clearly can not conduct regime or state change in a country and assume that the entire nation is defeated.

<sup>261</sup> Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 676.

<sup>262</sup> However, the mission assessment yes or no true or false data is all being annotated digitally on an excel spreadsheet. Going back to change the mission assessments to see its effects is as easy as a click of a button.

theory technique called Operational Net Assessment (ONA).<sup>263</sup> The ONA is the systems of system analysis (SoSA), which uses the model PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information). The SoSA defines the operational environment as being a complex adaptive system. However, only portions of ONA enable the quantifiable determination of troop strength and type of a stability force. This model uses these portions to determine the operational environments implications for troops.<sup>264</sup>



**Figure D-1 Elements of Relative Stability Power Analysis**

The host nation assessment uses a hybrid of PMESII and the post conflict stability and reconstruction essential tasks list.<sup>265</sup> Identifying a host country relationship with its neighbors and the level of development assesses the timeline for such operations. Each country starting point will determine the speed in which move through this operational continuum. This is the time required conducting the initial response operations, the transformational operations to build the country, and then fostering self-sustainability.<sup>266</sup> The Regional assessment analyzes the bordering countries in terms of *opposition*, *apathetic*, or (coalition) *allied* borders and whether the border country is a

<sup>263</sup>United States Joint Doctrine Command, *JP 5-0 Joint Operations Planning*, (Fort Belvoir, Virginia: United States Joint Doctrine Directorate, 2006), 323.

<sup>264</sup>Ibid.

<sup>265</sup>CADD, *Brief on New COIN Doctrine*, 1.

<sup>266</sup>CSIS and Orr, *Winning the Peace*, 343

major trade partner or not. These delineations increase or decrease troop requirements based on the tasks assigned to the border during the mission requirement assessment. For example by changing a border status from friendly controlled to opposition the *troop to mile* ratio goes from 3.5 to 8.3 soldiers per mile.<sup>267</sup> Additionally, by reviewing imagery we can determine the number of border crossing sites and the amount of troops required to block or screen traffic respective to aforementioned mission assessment.

By applying this technique of regional assessment, we can determine that Iraq needs 18,000 troops dedicated to securing the border. Specifically, we can determine 6,000 troops to border crossing sites and 12,000 to the borders themselves. Moreover, by accounting for the 30,000-member border patrol that previously existed during the Saddam regime we can mitigate this requirement. That is if these troops were available. By selecting to demobilize the nationalistic party and defeat the state only (and not the nation) these 30,000 border guards are not available and require coalition troops to fill the void.<sup>268</sup>

This regional border assessment is an example of analyzing requirements to *secure the operational environment*. By taking the context of the strategic policy and objectives against the context of the host nation capabilities, we can determine the initial force requirements to secure the borders. This analysis combined with the troop requirement analysis in appendix C *troop to ethnic density* ratio assist in determining requirements for both *securing the environment* and *the population*. Applying this holistic assessment of the operational environment, we can extract information to determine more detailed troop requirements juxtapose the inhabitants of the host nation. For example, when determining the size force needed to conduct a major combat operation against an opposing military we can use the aforementioned CoFMs, combat power analysis. Population density analysis is one form of determining number of troops in COIN operations.

Analysis of the status of the essential services facilitates determining what types of troops are

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<sup>267</sup>These ratio are determined from border guard requirements in sectors such the Washington sector and the Del Rio Texas sector on the American Border post 9/11. Available on <http://www.cbp.gov/>

<sup>268</sup>Until such time that the coalition can train 18,000 border guards to relieve coalition soldiers.



needed in COIN. Readily available ratios such as *Physician to Person*, *Teacher to Person*, *Hospital Bed per 1000 persons* help to determine stability operation requirements. Infrastructure status, number and type of schools, electric consumption, access to water and sanitation all facilitate measures of essential services known as SWEAT-MS. The immediate post-conflict occupation can facilitate an even more detailed assessment of these services and can confirm pre-conflict estimates on attrition. By understanding the capacity of the host country, juxtapose a close benchmark country we can identify performance requirements for our stability operations. By using the country of Jordan as a benchmark vis-à-vis Iraq, we can apply a regional standard to determine the goal respective to the service. These requirements minus the coalition's capabilities will determine shortfalls. This method of requirements-capability-shortfalls is at the heart of relative stability analysis. One example of this analysis is Medical Sub-line of SWEAT-MS.

When assessing the medical systems within the host nation we can reference the *Physician to Person*, the *Nurse to Person*, the *general health worker to person* ratios readily available on the World Health Organization website.<sup>269</sup> For example, In 2003 Iraq had over 17,000 Physicians, over 32,000 nurses and employed over 60,000 health care workers.<sup>270</sup> Additionally, Iraq has 135 hospitals over 1,050 health centers with a total hospital bed per 1000 person ratio of 114.5.<sup>271</sup> By using a benchmark standard of Jordan, Iraq would need an additional, 38,000 physicians, 56,000 nurses, 54,000 general health care workers, and 143 more hospitals. This is the requirement that existed before the coalition invasion. By analysis-estimated attrition that occurs when these skilled workers flee the country in the advent of war our requirements increase. These daunting requirements may even give Dr. Barnett's SYS-ADMIN pause.<sup>272</sup>

Just in terms of restoring health care to its original status before conflict US coalition forces can fill this void if employed in this direct action role. With five of the aforementioned SRSBs and the remaining medical workers post conflict attrition, we can fill 91% of the original health care

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<sup>269</sup> Available in this website <http://www.emro.who.int/mnh/whd/CountryStatistics.html>

<sup>270</sup> Ibid

<sup>271</sup> Ibid

<sup>272</sup> Barnett, Thomas P.M. 2004, 13

capacity. This will stabilize the country in this post conflict environment, but also by securing these hospitals as described in the previous chapter we can enable the safe return of the expatriated medical workers. In terms of the regional Jordanian benchmark a combination of several programs are required. The initial response phase of the post-conflict stabilization operation includes securing 12 medical and 21 nursing schools.<sup>273</sup> This will facilitate maintaining the current flow of health care employees into the market. Additionally as mentioned before, by securing these 135 hospitals and 1000 plus health centers we allow NGO, PVO, and USAID “pile on.” In the mid term instituting student exchanges of Iraqi nurse and medical students to the coalition countries, we can invoke a program discussed by Mr. Nye in soft power and begin to increase the host nation’s health force.<sup>274</sup>

The analyzing of the medical capacity of a country is one example of the various SWEAT-MS analysis process exhibited in this analysis tool. Additionally, this analysis will approximate the number of road construction crews to build or repave every road in the host nation.<sup>275</sup> It will determine the required gallons of water daily per person, the schools to be built and so. This workbook shows one method of how to determine the troop requirements and troop types needed to stabilize a country.

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<sup>273</sup>Immanuel Ness, 128

<sup>274</sup>Nye, 191

<sup>275</sup>William Pettitt, "Senior Manager for Engineer,"

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